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ABSTRACT
Algorithmic profiling technologies are impeding the economic security of
low-income people in the United States. Based on their digital profiles, lowincome people are targeted for predatory marketing campaigns and financial
products. At the same time, algorithmic decision-making can result in their
exclusion from mainstream employment, housing, financial, health care, and
educational opportunities. Government agencies are turning to algorithms to
apportion social services, yet these algorithms lack transparency, leaving
thousands of people adrift without state support and not knowing why.
Marginalized communities are also subject to disproportionately high levels
of surveillance, including facial recognition technology and the use of
predictive policing software.
American privacy law is no bulwark against these profiling harms, instead
placing the onus of protecting personal data on individuals while leaving
government and businesses largely free to collect, analyze, share, and sell
personal data. By contrast, in the European Union, the General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) gives EU residents numerous, enforceable
rights to control their personal data. Spurred in part by the GDPR, Congress
is debating whether to adopt comprehensive privacy legislation in the United
States. This article contends that the GDPR contains several provisions that
have the potential to limit digital discrimination against the poor, while
enhancing their economic stability and mobility. The GDPR provides the
following: (1) the right to an explanation about automated decision-making;
(2) the right not to be subject to decisions based solely on automated
profiling; (3) the right to be forgotten; (4) opportunities for public
participation in data processing programs; and (5) robust implementation
*
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and enforcement tools. The interests of low-income people must be part of
privacy lawmaking, and the GDPR is a useful template for thinking about
how to meet their data privacy needs.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

On May 18, 2018, citizens of the European Union awoke to a new, robust
set of data privacy protections codified in the General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR), which gives them new levels of control over their
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personal information.1 Meanwhile, Americans rise daily to the same
fragmented privacy regime that has failed to forestall a drumbeat of data
breaches, online misinformation campaigns, and a robust market in the sale
of personal data, usually without their knowledge.2 For instance, in 2017, the
credit reporting company Equifax disclosed that hackers had breached its
servers and stolen the personal data of almost half the United States’s
population.3 In 2018, we learned that Cambridge Analytica harvested the data
of over 50 million Americans through personality quizzes on Facebook in
order to target voters with political advertisements for the Trump campaign. 4
And, as consumers are bombarded with advertisements based on their
internet searches or remarks captured by digital assistants such as Amazon’s
Alexa, Americans are increasingly realizing that their online and offline
behavior is being tracked and sold as part of a massive, networked data-forprofit and surveillance system.5
The American privacy regime is largely based on a notice and consent
model that puts the onus on individuals to protect their own privacy. 6 The
model is not working. In the absence of congressional action, some states
have enacted laws to protect the data privacy and/or security of their citizens. 7
California has enacted the most comprehensive statute, effective January
2020, entitled the California Consumer Privacy Act, which expands
transparency about the big data marketplace and gives consumers the right to
opt-out of having their data sold to third parties. 8 Other states may soon
1.
Commission Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 [hereinafter GDPR].
2.
See SARAH E. IGO, THE KNOWN CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF PRIVACY IN MODERN AMERICA
353–55 (2018).
3.
Stacy Cowley, 2.5 Million More People Potentially Exposed in Equifax Breach, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/02/business/equifax-breach.html
[https://perma.cc/8VWZ-L653].
4.
Matthew Rosenberg, Nicholas Confessore & Carole Cadwalladr, How Trump
Consultants Exploited the Facebook Data of Millions, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/17/us/politics/cambridge-analytica-trumpcampaign.html?module=inline [https://perma.cc/9LVD-9DAG].
5.
Lee Rainie, Americans’ Complicated Feelings About Social Media in an Era of Privacy
Concerns, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2018/03/27/americans-complicated-feelings-about-social-media-in-an-era-of-privacyconcerns/ [https://perma.cc/8WLL-QL4Y].
6.
See Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV.
L. REV. 1880, 1882–83 (2013).
7.
State Laws Related to Internet Privacy, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan. 27, 2020),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/state-lawsrelated-to-internet-privacy.aspx#Consumer [https://perma.cc/68V2-C338].
8.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100 (West 2020). For more analysis of the California Consumer
Privacy Act, see infra Part IV.
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follow suit. After years of resistance, Big Tech companies such as Facebook,
Google, Microsoft and Apple are now advocating for a national data
protection law, primarily because they are worried about the emergence of
varying state standards.9 Moreover, Big Tech is already working to comply
with the GDPR for their millions of European consumers. 10 In light of these
new laws and the American public’s “techlash” against revelations of big data
scandals,11 Congress is finally and seriously considering comprehensive
privacy legislation.12 While the issue has bipartisan support, proposals vary
in their solicitude for corporations versus consumers. 13 As these issues are
being actively debated, it is essential that the legislative process include the
interests of all Americans, and not just elites and industry.
Simply put, digital privacy needs are not the same for all Americans.
Based on their digital profiles, low-income people are targeted with
marketing campaigns for predatory products such as payday loans and forprofit educational scams.14 At the same time, algorithmic decision-making
can result in their exclusion from mainstream employment, housing,
financial, and educational opportunities.15 Government agencies are turning
to algorithms to apportion public benefits, yet these automated decisionmaking systems lack transparency, leaving thousands of people adrift without
state support and not knowing why.16 Marginalized communities are also
subject to high levels of law enforcement surveillance, including the use of
9.
See, e.g., Ben Brody & Spencer Soper, Amazon Joins Tech Giants in Backing Federal
Privacy
Safeguards,
BLOOMBERG
(Sept.
26,
2018),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-26/amazon-joins-tech-giants-in-backingfederal-privacy-safeguards [https://perma.cc/QTW7-ZC24].
10. See Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Towards a Global Data Privacy Standard,
71 FLA. L. REV. 365, 389–91 (2019) (“All U.S. companies could either comply with the GDPR
or cease offering sales and services to EU consumers.”).
11. See Ben Zimmer, ‘Techlash’: Whipping Up Criticism of the Top Tech Companies,
WALL STREET J. (Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/techlash-whipping-up-criticismof-the-top-tech-companies-11547146279 [https://perma.cc/5G42-GL2G].
12. See Cameron F. Kerry, Breaking Down Proposals for Privacy Legislation: How Do
They Regulate?, BROOKINGS (Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/breakingdown-proposals-for-privacy-legislation-how-do-they-regulate/ [https://perma.cc/6QXK-ZHSJ].
13. See id. (summarizing differences between proposed bills).
14. See generally CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA
INCREASES INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY (2016).
15. See Jonas Lerman, Big Data and Its Exclusions, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 55 (2013),
https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/privacy-and-big-data-big-data-and-its-exclusions/
[https://perma.cc/L3XP-FXDR]; see also Matthew Desmond & Bruce Western, Poverty in
America: New Directions and Debates, 44 ANN. REV. SOC. 305, 308 (2018) (describing how
social exclusion is a form of deprivation).
16. See generally Sarah Valentine, Impoverished Algorithms: Misguided Governments,
Flawed Technologies, and Social Control, 46 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 364 (2019).
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predictive policing software, which relies on data profiling to target certain
neighborhoods or people.17 These communities are also deeply concerned
about facial recognition software, which is increasingly used by law
enforcement and low-income housing developments. 18 The internet
experience is also different for low-income people than their more affluent
counterparts, both in terms of how they access the internet and the advertising
that is displayed to them.19
These harms impede the economic security of low-income people, with
ripple effects to other poverty-related deprivations, such as poor physical and
mental health, family instability, threat of violence, environmental harms,
low wages or lack of work, limited education, and inadequate living
standards.20 Thus, data privacy is not only integral to values such as autonomy
and dignity but also an important issue of economic justice—defined here as
ensuring “that everyone has access to the material resources that create
opportunities, in order to live a life unencumbered by pressing economic
concerns.”21
Although this article focuses on economic justice, it is impossible to
discuss class issues without recognizing how economic subordination is
17. See ANDREW GUTHRIE FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING: SURVEILLANCE,
RACE, AND THE FUTURE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT (2017).
18. See Tanvi Misra, The Tenants Fighting Back Against Facial Recognition Technology,
CITYLAB (May 7, 2019), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2019/05/facial-recognition-techsurveillance-security-amazon-ring/588436/ [https://perma.cc/T4FB-BRSL].
19. Mary Madden, Michele E. Gilman, Karen Levy & Alice E. Marwick, Privacy, Poverty,
and Big Data: A Matrix of Vulnerabilities for Poor Americans, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 53, 57
(2017); Michael Fertik, The Rich See a Different Internet than the Poor, SCI. AM. (Feb. 1, 2013),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/rich-see-different-internet-than-the-poor/
[https://perma.cc/8ZUY-H6FR].
20. See generally BRIAN GLASSMAN, MULTIDIMENSIONAL DEPRIVATION IN THE UNITED
STATES:
2017
(2019),
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2019/demo/acs-40.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7JSQ-XFDM]. Among the six dimensions of poverty measured in the
Multidimensional Deprivation Index, 37.1% of the United States population was deprived in one
or more dimensions in 2017. Id. at 7. This is significantly higher than the 2017 official poverty
measure based on the American Community Survey—which is based solely on income—of
13.4%. Id. at 2.
21. Sandro Galea, On Economic Justice, B.U. SCH. PUB. HEALTH (Jan. 29, 2017),
https://www.bu.edu/sph/2017/01/29/on-economic-justice/ [https://perma.cc/JU48-7F2U].
Economic justice concerns include the “distribution of income, wealth, and opportunity,”
“individual and group rights,” and “the relation of racial justice and gender justice to economic
justice.” Louise Simmons, Economic Justice, OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA SOC. WORK (Mar. 2017),
https://oxfordre.com/socialwork/socialwork/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199975839.001.0001/a
crefore-9780199975839-e-1266 [https://perma.cc/NMA5-KYGX] (discussing various realms of
economic justice).
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linked to race, gender, disability, LGBTQ status, and other intersectional
identities. Low socio-economic status is deeply intertwined with these
attributes as a result of histories of discrimination and marginalization. At the
same time, people who suffer poverty in America are a diverse and varied
group of people, each with their own narratives, strengths, and challenges. 22
Still, as a group, low-income people share vulnerabilities to data privacy
deprivations, which in turn pose a barrier to economic stability.23 This article
focuses on that common experience.
Given the rise of digital profiling and artificial intelligence, it is useful and
timely to consider whether existing privacy laws such as the GDPR serve the
needs of economically marginalized people in ways that should be
incorporated into United States law. This article argues that while the GDPR
is not a panacea, it contains provisions that have the potential to limit digital
discrimination against the poor, while enhancing their economic stability and
mobility. As a piece of legislation, the GDPR does not contain tools to
dismantle oppressive structures within the economy and society that
technology magnifies,24 but it does enhance transparency and accountability,
which in turn can serve social justice movements. With greater knowledge of
and control over personal data flows, Americans can consider other
substantive privacy interventions that might be necessary to advance
economic justice, such as limitations on targeted advertising, facial
recognition technology, workplace surveillance, and the like. Moreover,
American corporations are already working on compliance with these
statutes,25 and in the EU, governments are busy enforcing the GDPR. 26 Thus,
these provisions are within the realm of the possible and the practical. The
22. See JOHN GILLIOM, OVERSEERS OF THE POOR: SURVEILLANCE, RESISTANCE, AND THE
LIMITS OF PRIVACY 20–21 (2001) (describing demographic, political, physical, and regional
variations among poor people); see also FRANK MUNGER, LABORING BELOW THE LINE: THE NEW
ETHNOGRAPHY OF POVERTY, LOW-WAGE WORK, AND SURVIVAL IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 20
(Frank Munger ed., 2002) (asserting the importance of seeing and understanding the poor as
individuals with their own narratives).
23. For excellent analysis of how cyberspace technologies intersect with race, see generally
RUHA BENJAMIN, RACE AFTER TECHNOLOGY: ABOLITIONIST TOOLS FOR THE NEW JIM CODE
(2019) and SAFIYA UMOJA NOBLE, ALGORITHMS OF OPPRESSION: HOW SEARCH ENGINES
REINFORCE RACISM (2018).
24. See Ari Ezra Waldman, Power, Process, and Automated Decision-Making, 88
FORDHAM L. REV. 613, 620 (2019) (explaining how algorithmic decision-making “represents a
radical shift in the discourse of power.”). Waldman adds that “algorithmic decision-making
represents a distinctly neoliberal form of policy making” that enshrines values of efficiency and
innovation over values “like fairness, nondiscrimination, and human rights.” Id. at 624.
25. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 10, at 365.
26. See, e.g., GDPR Fines and Penalties, NATHAN TR. (Feb. 23, 2020),
https://www.nathantrust.com/gdpr-fines-penalties [https://perma.cc/5NRA-BXAF].
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GDPR is providing momentum for national legislation currently being
debated in Congress.27 For political and cultural reasons, it is unlikely
Congress will enact any law that is more protective of consumer interests than
the GDPR. Thus, the GDPR is a viable text for thinking about how to shore
up privacy for our most vulnerable communities, and it deserves extended
analysis and consideration from this perspective.
Part I describes the class differential in data privacy harms, explaining
how low-income people are susceptible to both unfair targeting and exclusion
based on their data profiles, as well as heightened social control through
surveillance. Mapping the landscape of digital privacy harms facing
marginalized groups is essential to bringing their experiences into
lawmaking. Part II explains why America’s current data privacy legal regime,
which centers on a notice and consent model, is woefully inadequate to
protect the privacy of Americans, with particularly harsh consequences for
low-income people. Part III analyzes five provisions in the GDPR that have
the potential to advance economic justice if similar provisions are enacted at
a federal level in the United States, or even in individual states. 28 These
provisions are as follows: (1) the right to an explanation about automated
decision-making; (2) the right not to be subject to decisions based on solely
automated profiling; (3) the right to be forgotten; (4) public participation in
data processing programs; and (5) robust implementation and enforcement
tools. Part IV considers how the California Consumer Privacy Act compares
to the GDPR in terms of economic justice objectives. While data privacy has
been aptly recognized as a civil rights issue,29 this article contends that data
27. See Paul M. Schwartz, Global Data Privacy: The EU Way, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 771, 773
(2019) (“The EU has taken an essential role in shaping how the world thinks about data privacy.”);
see also CONG. RESEARCH SERV., DATA PROTECTION LAW: AN OVERVIEW 50–51 (2019)
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45631.pdf [https://perma.cc/84W6-VTQX]; cf. Anupam Chander,
Margot E. Kaminski & William McGeveran, Catalyzing Privacy Law, MINN. L. REV.
(forthcoming
2020),
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3208&context=facpub
[https://perma.cc/VM7V-UXLH] (arguing that the California law is catalyzing privacy law across
the United States).
28. Lindsey Barrett, Confiding in Con Men: U.S. Privacy Law, the GDPR, and Information
Fiduciaries, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1057, 1063 (2019) (noting that some states “have already
begun to emulate certain aspects of the GDPR”).
29. See Letter from Access Humbolt et al., to Sen. Roger Wicker et al., (Feb. 13, 2019),
https://www.democraticmedia.org/sites/default/files/field/public-files/2019/letter_to_congress_o
n_civil_rights_and_privacy_2-13-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/7HSN-FBUY] (writing “to ensure that
civil rights retain a fundamental place in the ongoing privacy debate”); Becky Chao, Eric Null &
Brandi Collins-Dexter, Centering Civil Rights in the Privacy Debate, NEW AM. (Aug. 14, 2019),
https://www.newamerica.org/oti/reports/centering-civil-rights-privacy-debate/
[https://perma.cc/W52Z-TJ2C]; Aaron Rieke & Corrine Yu, Discrimination’s Digital Frontier,
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privacy is also an economic justice issue, and that both frames are essential
for enacting laws that benefit marginalized communities. The GDPR contains
mechanisms to combat illegal discrimination as well as to move towards a
substantive vision of economic justice.
II.

THE CLASS DIFFERENTIAL IN DATA PRIVACY HARMS

At all hours of the day, and deep into the night, our data is being harvested,
aggregated, and sold.30 Businesses generate immense profits from this mining
of big data, making use of our buying habits, social relationships, political
preferences, lifestyle, hobbies, health, and personality.31 The data extraction
industry relies on a wide range of sources, such as public records, web
browsing activity, emails, banking activity, social media, store loyalty cards,
online quizzes, license plate readers, app usage, smart devices (such as fitness
watches and internet-connected doorbells), and geo-location tracking on our
smartphones.32 “Increasingly, the market sees you from within, measuring
your body and emotional states, and watching as you move around your
house, the office, or the mall.”33 Data brokers combine and cross-reference
the “different sources of information they’ve bought and acquired, and then
create a single detailed file on you: a data profile of your digital shadow.” 34
Data brokers sell these profiles to eager purchasers, including marketers and
ATLANTIC (Apr. 15, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/04/facebooktargeted-marketing-perpetuates-discrimination/587059/ [https://perma.cc/7HJR-FW4U].
30. See IGO, supra note 2, at 355; Geoffrey A. Fowler, It’s the Middle of the Night. Do You
Know Who Your iPhone Is Talking to?, WASH. POST (May 28, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/05/28/its-middle-night-do-you-know-whoyour-iphone-is-talking/ [https://perma.cc/BZ83-VZLV].
31. See Wolfie Christl, Corporate Surveillance in Everyday Life, CRACKED LABS (June
2017),
https://crackedlabs.org/en/corporate-surveillance/
[https://perma.cc/JEY5-LWHV];
Jeremy B. Merrill, How to Wrestle Your Data From Data Brokers, Silicon Valley—and
Cambridge Analytica, PROPUBLICA (Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.propublica.org/article/how-towrestle-your-data-from-data-brokers-silicon-valley-and-cambridge-analytica
[https://perma.cc/FK3J-RK7X].
32. FED. TRADE COMM’N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY (2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/data-brokers-calltransparency-accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/BY66-56VQ]; Stuart A. Thompson &
Charlie Warzel, Opinion, Twelve Million Phones, One Dataset, Zero Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/12/19/opinion/location-tracking-cellphone.html [https://perma.cc/5YDZ-WU6G] (reporting on the ease of matching billions of
location data points originating from a single data location company with specific individuals).
33. Marion Fourcade & Kieran Healy, Seeing Like a Market, 15 SOCIO-ECON. REV. 9, 23
(2017).
34. HANNAH FRY, HELLO WORLD, BEING HUMAN IN THE AGE OF ALGORITHMS 32 (2018).
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retailers, law enforcement, financial companies, educational institutions,
employers, and government agencies, who then use the data for their own
purposes.35 Big Tech companies such as Amazon, Google, and Facebook are
also mining their consumers’ data and selling access to this information trove
to advertisers.36 In addition, almost every major industry is using their
customer’s data to integrate with these data networks in order to expand their
profits.37 Government agencies both sell and purchase their citizens’ personal
data, thus blurring the distinction between public and private harms and
remedies.
There is a longstanding tension between Americans’ desire for privacy and
the “free” services provided by social media and search engines. 38 A Pew
survey on social media usage found that ninety-one percent of Americans are
concerned about lacking control over their personal information. 39 And yet,
only one in ten Facebook users exited the platform after learning about the
Cambridge Analytica scandal. 40 For many people, it appears that the harms
of the surveillance economy do not rise beyond a sense of creepiness at being
followed around the web by ads for products they briefly perused online. This
apathy is slowly changing, however, as Americans learn more about the
consequences of their data collection. For instance, while most Americans
remain on Facebook, many are changing their online behavior, some are

35. Id. at 31; FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 32.
36. See FRY, supra note 34, at 36; Steve Lohr, Calls Mount To Ease Big Tech’s Grip on
Your Data, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/25/business/callsmount-to-ease-big-techs-grip-on-your-data.html
[https://perma.cc/V4L8-SEN6];
Angela
Moscaritolo, What Does Big Tech Know About You? Basically Everything, PC MAG (Apr. 8,
2020), https://www.pcmag.com/news/366327/what-does-big-tech-know-about-you-basicallyeverything [https://perma.cc/U5ND-6X2S]; The Rise of Data Capital, MIT TECH. REV. CUSTOM
& ORACLE (2016), http://files.technologyreview.com/whitepapers/MIT_Oracle+ReportThe_Rise_of_Data_Capital.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XDG-URQY].
37. See Christl, supra note 31.
38. Max Eddy, Online Data Protection 101: Don’t Let Big Tech Get Rich Off Your Info, PC
MAG (Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.pcmag.com/news/online-data-protection-101-dont-let-bigtech-get-rich-off-your-info [https://perma.cc/2CBC-MAZE].
39. See Rainie, supra note 5.
40. Chris Raymond, So What Do You Think of Facebook Now?, CONSUMER REP. (Mar. 15,
2019),
https://www.consumerreports.org/social-media/what-do-you-think-of-facebook-nowsurvey/ [https://perma.cc/4PT3-4CVW]. Even when people exit Facebook—or never engage with
it in the first place—it maintains “shadow profiles” on them. See Russell Brandom, Shadow
Profiles Are the Biggest Flaw in Facebook’s Privacy Defense, VERGE (Apr. 11, 2018),
https://www.theverge.com/2018/4/11/17225482/facebook-shadow-profiles-zuckerbergcongress-data-privacy [https://perma.cc/Q3T8-7F27]; Sarah Jeong, I Tried Leaving Facebook. I
Couldn’t, VERGE (Apr. 28, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/4/28/17293056/facebookdeletefacebook-social-network-monopoly [https://perma.cc/HA2G-686G].
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actively subverting surveillance technologies, 41 and large majorities believe
we need stronger legal protections for our data. 42
The need for greater legal protections is particularly acute for low-income
people, 43 who pay the highest price for our surveillance economy. We live in
“a data environment . . . in which individuals are constantly surveyed and
evaluated, categorized and grouped, rated and ranked, numbered and
quantified, included or excluded, and as a result, treated differently.” 44 In one
sense, this is nothing new—poor people have been stigmatized and surveilled
for centuries.45 However, technology is hyper-charging this dynamic, while
simultaneously obscuring the structural disadvantages that oppress lowincome populations.46 The big data ecosystem and its algorithmic outputs,
along with a corresponding lack of privacy protections, undermine economic
justice for marginalized people in at least three overarching and intersecting
ways, subjecting them to digital discrimination and electronic exploitation;
inaccuracies; and surveillance.47
41. See, e.g., Elise Thomas, How To Hack Your Face To Dodge the Rise of Facial
Recognition Tech, WIRED (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/avoid-facialrecognition-software [https://perma.cc/VP6N-9R78]; Malia Wollan, How To Thwart Facial
Recognition, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/30/magazine/howto-thwart-facial-recognition.html [https://perma.cc/GSS7-WG9A].
42. See Raine, supra note 5.
43. This article defines the words “low-income” and “poverty” and “low socio-economic
status” to mean people living under “economic deprivation”—or lack of economic resources with
attendant negative social consequences—without endorsing any particular method of measuring
poverty. See JOHN ICELAND, POVERTY IN AMERICA: A HANDBOOK 23 (3d ed. 2013) (defining
poverty). The United States uses an absolute measure in calculating the official poverty line (i.e.,
it is based on a needs standard that is constant over time), whereas relative measures are based on
comparative disadvantage, fluctuating over time. Id. at 23–24. Under federal government
measures, the poverty line is generally a lower financial threshold than the standards used to
define low-income. See Alicia Mazzara & Barbara Sard, Chart Book: Employment and Earnings
for Households Receiving Federal Rental Assistance, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Feb.
5, 2018), https://www.cbpp.org/research/housing/chart-book-employment-and-earnings-forhouseholds-receiving-federal-rental#_ftn5 [https://perma.cc/9XYL-JWLC]. On the various
methods of measuring poverty and their controversies and merits, see generally ICELAND, supra
at ch. 3.
44. See Christl, supra note 31.
45. See VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE,
POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR 14–38 (2018); Wendy A. Bach, Prosecuting Poverty,
Criminalizing Care, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 809, 818–20 (2019).
46. EUBANKS, supra note 45, at 33–37; IGO, supra note 2, at 357 (“What gives the current
moment its special urgency is a uniquely combustible combination: a deluge of volunteered or
solicited personal information, on the one hand, and the increasingly sophisticated capacities of
other parties for linking, sharing, and acting on it, on the other.”).
47. There are numerous, serious other big data harms and technological privacy intrusions
outside the scope of this article, such as immigration surveillance, online targeting of women in
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A. Digital Discrimination/Electronic Exploitation
People with low socio-economic status face both digital discrimination
and economic exploitation when businesses and government use
technological tools to target them for unfair products and services or to
exclude them from mainstream opportunities. These tools add scope, scale,
and speed to long-standing economic vulnerabilities. Algorithmic decisionmaking,48 or computerized analysis of large data sets to infer correlations, is
fueling these patterns of targeting and exclusion, thus making it harder for
low-income people to move up the economic ladder. 49 Employers use
algorithms to decide who to target with job postings, who to interview, and
who to hire.50 Landlords use tenant screening reports generated by algorithms
to assess who is likely to pay their rent on time.51 Colleges use algorithms to
identify applicants who are most likely to attend and to stay in school. 52
Government social service agencies use algorithms to determine program
eligibility and track recipients’ compliance. 53 Law enforcement agencies use
algorithms to predict criminal hot spots and identify suspects. 54 The criminal
justice system uses algorithms to determine bail on the front end and
sentencing on the back end.55 While these examples can all encompass
legitimate societal objectives, inequities arise when algorithms reinforce
ways that threaten their personal safety, and online disinformation campaigns. In addition, poor
people suffer greater injuries resulting from data breaches, and thus benefit from enhanced
cybersecurity efforts and enforcement. See Sarah Dranoff, Identity Theft: A Low-Income Issue,
A.B.A.
(Dec.
15,
2014),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_services/publications/dialogue/volume/17/winter2014/identity-theft--a-lowincome-issue/ [https://perma.cc/2PNX-FYVM].
48. Some algorithms are rule-based, meaning they are human constructed and “direct and
unambiguous,” such as an automated decision tree. FRY, supra note 34, at 10. Other algorithms
are used in machine learning (a form of artificial intelligence or AI), which “refers to an automated
process of discovering correlations . . . between variables in a dataset, often to make predictions
or estimates of some outcome.” David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with the Data: What Legal
Scholars Should Learn About Machine Learning, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653, 671 (2017).
49. Anupam Chander, The Racist Algorithm?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1023, 1026–27 (2017)
(examples of discrimination); Id. at 1036–39 (means by which discrimination operates
unintentionally in algorithms).
50. See Stephanie Bornstein, Antidiscriminatory Algorithms, 70 ALA. L. REV. 519, 530–33
(2018).
51. James A. Allen, The Color of Algorithms: An Analysis and Proposed Research Agenda
for Deterring Algorithmic Redlining, 46 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 219, 251–53 (2019).
52. Madden et al., supra note 19, at 98–103.
53. Valentine, supra note 16, at 370–71.
54. FRY, supra note 34, at 154–59; Emily Berman, A Government of Laws and Not of
Machines, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1277, 1293 (2018); Aziz Z. Huq, Racial Equity in Algorithmic
Criminal Justice, 68 DUKE L.J. 1043, 1049–50, 1068–72 (2019).
55. Huq, supra note 54, at 1072–76.
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divides in economic status or result in discrimination against marginalized
groups.
Employment. There are numerous examples of algorithms that
discriminated against people who are protected under anti-discrimination
civil rights laws.56 For instance, Amazon tested a hiring algorithm for
technical jobs that turned out to be biased against women.57 The programmers
fed data into the algorithm culled from Amazon’s prior ten years of resumes,
which were predominated by white males. The algorithm then linked the
traits on those resumes to predictions about future success, thereby
disfavoring resumes that contained words associated with women. 58
Similarly, a study that tested Google’s ad platform created a simulation that
found that ads related to career coaching for high paid executive positions
were funneled more frequently to men than women, although the cause was
unclear.59 It “might have resulted unintentionally from algorithms optimizing
click-through rates or other metrics free of bigotry.”60
In legal terms, this may have been a case of disparate impact, or the
differential treatment of certain groups based on neutral criteria. 61 In practical
terms, it means that women may continue to suffer from a gender pay gap
that leaves them disproportionately underpaid compared to men, which
56. Federal laws prohibit discrimination on the on the basis of race, color, national origin,
religion, age, gender, pregnancy, veteran’s status, genetic information, and physical or mental
disability. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2018). Some state laws protect additional groups. See
EEO Protected Classes by State and Municipality, XPERTHR, https://www.xperthr.com/fiftystate-charts/eeo-protected-classes-by-state-and-municipality/9953/
[https://perma.cc/P6NNNW2Y].
57. Nicol Turner Lee, Paul Resnick & Genie Barton, Algorithmic Bias Detection and
Mitigation: Best Practices and Policies To Reduce Consumer Harms, BROOKINGS (May 22,
2019),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/algorithmic-bias-detection-and-mitigation-bestpractices-and-policies-to-reduce-consumer-harms/#footref-10 [https://perma.cc/XY6N-HGGL].
58. Id. Amazon is 60% male and 74% of managers are male. Id. The company says it did
not implement the hiring tool. Id.; see also Jeffrey Dastin, Amazon Scraps Secret AI Recruiting
Tool
that
Showed
Bias
Against
Women,
REUTERS
(Oct.
9,
2018),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-amazon-com-jobs-automation-insight/amazon-scraps-secretai-recruiting-tool-that-showed-bias-against-women-idUSKCN1MK08G [https://perma.cc/9T7YL7CL].
59. Amit Datta, Michael Carl Tschantz & Anupam Datta, Automated Experiments on Ad
Privacy Settings: A Tale of Opacity, Choice, and Discrimination, 1 PROC. ON PRIVACY
ENHANCING TECHS. 92 (2015), http://www.andrew.cmu.edu/user/danupam/dtd-pets15.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q4AU-6B2E].
60. Id. at 105.
61. On the difference between disparate impact and disparate treatment theories in
discrimination law, see Deborah L. Brake, The Shifting Sands of Employment Discrimination:
From Unjustified Impact to Disparate Treatment in Pregnancy and Pay, 105 GEO. L.J 559, 564–
69 (2017).
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contributes to the feminization of poverty, or higher rates of poverty among
women.62 Another example comes from a hiring algorithm designed to
predict employee tenure; it found the single best predictor of tenure was
distance between home and work,63 a factor that was highly correlated with
race.64 In turn, racial discrimination in employment compounds the racial
wealth gap and perpetuates disproportionate poverty for AfricanAmericans.65 “Since many social patterns related to education and work
reflect troubled legacies of racism, sexism, and other forms of socioeconomic
disadvantage, blindly replicating those patterns via software will only
perpetuate and exacerbate historical disparities.” 66
In 2019, Facebook settled five lawsuits brought by civil rights
organizations and individuals alleging that it permitted housing, job, and loan
companies to micro-target advertisements on Facebook’s platform to certain
groups.67 Among the alleged wrongdoing, Facebook’s ad system excluded
62. See ICELAND, supra note 43, at 99–100; Michele E. Gilman, En-Gendering Economic
Inequality, 32 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 9–13 (2016).
63. Joseph Walker, Meet the New Boss: Big Data, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 20, 2012),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390443890304578006252019616768
[https://perma.cc/SM69-6YD8]. The company dropped that variable. Id.
64. Id.
65. See Brentin Mock, Why Can’t We Close the Racial Wealth Gap?, CITYLAB (Mar. 21,
2019),
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2019/03/racial-wealth-gap-income-inequality-blackwhite-households/585325/ [https://perma.cc/35V6-SPFC] (reporting on a study of how the racial
income gap feeds the racial wealth gap); Thomas Shapiro, Tatjana Meschede & Sam Osoro, The
Roots of the Widening Racial Wealth Gap: Explaining the Black-White Economic Divide, INST.
ON ASSETS & SOC. POL’Y (2013), https://heller.brandeis.edu/iasp/pdfs/racial-wealthequity/racial-wealth-gap/roots-widening-racial-wealth-gap.pdf [https://perma.cc/TG2Z-AQUF].
66. MIRANDA BOGEN & AARON RIEKE, HELP WANTED: AN EXAMINATION OF HIRING
ALGORITHMS,
EQUITY,
AND
BIAS
8
(Dec.
2018),
https://www.upturn.org/static/reports/2018/hiring-algorithms/files/Upturn%20-%20Help%20Wanted%20%20An%20Exploration%20of%20Hiring%20Algorithms,%20Equity%20and%20Bias.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W24P-2QXE].
67. Tracy Jan & Elizabeth Dwoskin, Facebook Agrees To Overhaul Targeted Advertising
System for Job, Housing and Loan Ads After Discrimination Complaints, WASH. POST (Mar. 19,
2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/facebook-agrees-to-dismantletargeted-advertising-system-for-job-housing-and-loan-ads-after-discriminationcomplaints/2019/03/19/7dc9b5fa-4983-11e9-b79a-961983b7e0cd_story.html
[https://perma.cc/G2X7-V536]. ProPublica reporting uncovered the micro-targeting. Julia
Angwin & Terry Parris, Jr., Facebook Lets Advertisers Exclude Users by Race, PROPUBLICA (Oct.
28, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-lets-advertisers-exclude-users-by-race
[https://perma.cc/R8XD-WY58]; Julia Angwin, Ariana Tobin & Madeleine Varner, Facebook
(Still) Letting Housing Advertisers Exclude Users by Race, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 21, 2017),
https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-advertising-discrimination-housing-race-sexnational-origin [https://perma.cc/KF62-8WVL]; Julia Angwin, Noam Scheiber & Ariana Tobin,
Dozens of Companies Are Using Facebook To Exclude Older Workers from Job Ads,
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people with a certain “ethnic affinity” from seeing housing ads 68 and excluded
women from viewing job postings that employers wanted targeted to men,
such as Uber drivers, truck drivers, and roofers.69 To offer this targeted
advertising, Facebook classified people into more than 50,000 categories
such as “English as a second language,” “disabled parking permit,” or
“Telemundo.”70
Under the terms of the settlement,71 Facebook’s advertisers will no longer
be able to target people based on sensitive categories such as age, gender, zip
code, or race. However, a study found that advertising discrimination on
Facebook persists post-settlement apparently because the modified
algorithms target viewers based on proxy variables and ad content. 72
Moreover, targeting by income is not prohibited under the settlement, 73 just
as poverty is not a protected class under discrimination law. 74 This legal gap
magnifies economic inequality. People click on certain ads, while skipping
others, due to “deep-seated social inequities: the neighborhood they live in,
where they went to school, how much money they have. An ad system that is
designed to maximize clicks, and to maximize profits for Facebook, will
naturally reinforce these social inequities and so serve as a barrier to equal
opportunity.”75

PROPUBLICA
(Dec.
20, 2017), https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-ads-agediscrimination-targeting [https://perma.cc/FE9A-9QRV].
68. See Jan & Dwoskin, supra note 67.
69. See Nitasha Tiku, ACLU Says Facebook Ads Let Employers Favor Men over Women,
WIRED (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/aclu-says-facebook-ads-let-employersfavor-men-over-women/ [https://perma.cc/WM35-KEBZ].
70. See Jan & Dwoskin, supra note 67. Facebook is facing a separate class action lawsuit
alleging age and gender discrimination in the financial advertising it serves on its platform. See
John Detrixhe & Jeremy B. Merrill, The Fight Against Financial Advertisers Using Facebook for
Digital Redlining, QUARTZ (Nov. 1, 2019), https://qz.com/1733345/the-fight-againstdiscriminatory-financial-ads-on-facebook/ [https://perma.cc/A69L-VSS2].
71. For the settlement agreement of claims brought by housing advocates, see Settlement
Agreement and Release Between National Fair Housing Alliance et al., and Facebook, NAT’L
FAIR HOUSING ALLIANCE
(Mar.
28,
2019),
https://nationalfairhousing.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/03/FINAL-SIGNED-NFHA-FB-Settlement-Agreement00368652x9CCC2.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7G7-V2FJ] [hereinafter Settlement Agreement].
72. Piotr Sapiezynski et al., Algorithms that “Don’t See Color”: Comparing Biases in
Lookalike and Special Ad Audiences (2019), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1912.07579.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3L7C-8RLT].
73. Targeting by source of lawful income is prohibited under the settlement. Settlement
Agreement, supra note 71.
74. Danieli Evans Peterman, Socioeconomic Status Discrimination, 104 VA. L. REV. 1283,
1291–92, 1300 (2018).
75. Rieke & Yu, supra note 29.
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Education. Big data is used not only to discriminate among groups but
also to exploit marginalized groups. Poverty has many causes; it “is not
simply the byproduct of one’s attributes or historical outcomes but is also
actively produced through unequal relationships between the financially
secure and insecure.”76 An exploitative relationship is exemplified in the forprofit higher educational field, where “lead generation” websites
surreptitiously gather information about potential students when people
conduct web searches for terms such as welfare benefits.77 The lead
generators target low-income people and veterans and then sell their personal
data to for-profit colleges, who subsequently apply deceptive and strongarmed marketing tactics to potential students, encouraging them to take out
massive loans to enroll.78 At these for-profit colleges, students often assume
crippling debt with few job prospects and low graduation rates. 79
Within the non-profit college landscape, some colleges use tracking
software to collect and analyze data on high school students who visit their
admissions websites (without the students’ knowledge). 80 Algorithms then
identify which students are most likely to attend and pay full tuition rates. 81
When admission offices use these algorithms to focus on affluent students,
underprivileged high school students may end up excluded from recruiting
efforts. Algorithms provide increased opportunities for economic
segmentation.
Financial Services. Another example of data exploitation arises in the
financial services setting. Online lead generation is steering low-income,
predominantly African-American consumers to high-interest payday loans. 82
These ads are able to reach consumers even in states where payday lending
76.
77.

Desmond & Western, supra note 15, at 310.
See U.S. PUB. INTEREST RESEARCH GRP. & CTR. FOR DIG. DEMOCRACY, PRIVATE FORPROFIT COLLEGES AND ONLINE LEAD GENERATION: PRIVATE UNIVERSITIES USE DIGITAL
MARKETING TO TARGET PROSPECTS, INCLUDING VETERANS, VIA THE INTERNET (May 2015),
https://www.democraticmedia.org/sites/default/files/field/publicfiles/2015/forprofitcollegeleadgenreport_may2015_uspirgef_cdd_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KVD6-T773].
78. Id.
79. See Maura Dundon, Students or Consumers? For-Profit Colleges and the Practical and
Theoretical Role of Consumer Protection, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 375, 376–77 (2015).
80. Douglas MacMillan & Nick Anderson, Student Tracking, Secret Scores: How College
Admissions Offices Rank Prospects Before They Apply, WASH. POST (Oct. 14, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/10/14/colleges-quietly-rank-prospectivestudents-based-their-personal-data/ [https://perma.cc/YTV8-SYL4].
81. Id.
82. UPTURN, LED ASTRAY: ONLINE LEAD GENERATION AND PAYDAY LOANS (Oct. 2015),
https://www.upturn.org/static/reports/2015/led-astray/files/Upturn_-_Led_Astray_v.1.01.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z8MD-87WJ].
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is unlawful.83 One lead generator provides payday loan companies with
highly segmented lists that identify “consumers who are struggling to make
their bills and are looking for fast quick cash.” 84 Payday loans are financially
harmful because they charge high interest rates that are difficult for lowincome borrowers to pay back, thus placing them in an endless loop of highinterest borrowing to cover existing loans.85 Moreover, the industry is rife
with lax data security.86 The market in consumer data propels this consumer
exploitation.
In the mainstream financial market, credit scores are used to determine the
costs of borrowing money, and they are incorporated into reports used by the
gatekeepers to housing, employment, professional licensing, and education. 87
Thus, a low score can depress economic mobility,88 and certain groups within
society predictably have lower scores. “A good credit score is usually a proxy
for wealth, and wealth is a good proxy for race and national origin.” 89 Further,
many minorities are “credit invisible”—due to generations of discrimination
by banks, they have avoided mainstream financial services altogether and
thus do not generate the sort of information that feeds a credit score. 90
Members of this “lumpenscoretariat” have economic lives outside the formal
economy.91
Given these dynamics, there are concerns that mainstream credit scoring
models exclude alternate data points that could assist minorities in obtaining
83. Id.; Comments of Alvaro Bedoya and Clare Garvie, Center on Privacy & Technology at
Georgetown Law, on “Follow the Lead: An FTC Workshop on Lead Generation,” FED. TRADE
COMMISSION
(Dec.
18,
2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/2015/12/00017-99877.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q8YU-4SHM] [hereinafter Bedoya & Garvie].
84. Bedoya & Garvie, supra note 83.
85. See UPTURN, supra note 82.
86. Id.
87. See Vlad A. Hertza, Fighting Unfair Classifications in Credit Reporting: Should the
United States Adopt GDPR-Inspired Rights in Regulating Consumer Credit?, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1707, 1713 (2018); Lea Shepard, Toward a Stronger Financial History Antidiscrimination Norm,
53 B.C. L. REV. 1695, 1696 (2012).
88. Shepard, supra note 87, at 1734.
89. Hertza, supra note 87, at 1727.
90. See Lori T. Yearwood, Many Minorities Avoid Seeking Credit due to Generations of
Discrimination. Why That Keeps
Them Back, CNBC
(Sept.
1, 2019),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/01/many-minorities-avoid-seeking-credit-due-to-decades-ofdiscrimination.html [https://perma.cc/6YHZ-EFDX] (“Decades of discrimination by the federal
government and America’s financial institutions has induced an almost trauma-like response,
causing many people of color, particularly African-Americans, to adopt self-protective behavior
not unlike a post-traumatic stress reaction.”).
91. Fourcade & Healy, supra note 33, at 19. In the cloud economy, “Those who are invisible
are of little use.” Id.
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better credit terms, such as utility and rental payments, while instead relying
upon traditional data points that magnify existing disparities in access to
“high-quality education, well-paying jobs, and affordable loans.” 92 At the
same time, there is caution that alternative data points might “be designed to
identify and target vulnerable individuals with high-cost loan products.” 93
Without careful design and oversight, both traditional and alternative credit
rating models raise the risk that affordable credit will remain out of reach for
low-income consumers.
Housing. Automated decision-making by lenders is associated with higher
mortgage rates for Black and Latino borrowers as compared to similarly
situated white borrowers.94 Although the disparity is lower for fintech
mortgages than for traditional mortgages, this finding contradicts claims that
algorithms eliminate discrimination.95 All told, Black and Latino borrowers
are paying up to three quarters of a billion dollars more in mortgage interest
each year.96 Given the links between wealth accumulation and
homeownership, this mortgage disparity further drives the racial wealth gap. 97
In the rental market, many landlords are screening tenants with
algorithmically generated reports purchased from tenant screening
companies. A fair housing lawsuit is pending in Connecticut against a tenant

92. See Shepard, supra note 87, at 1731.
93. Mikella Hurley & Julius Adebayo, Credit Scoring in the Era of Big Data, 18 YALE J.L.
& TECH. 148, 167 (2017).
94. Aaron Glantz & Emmanuel Martinez, Kept Out: For People of Color, Banks Are
Shutting
the
Door
to
Homeownership,
REVEAL
(Feb.
15,
2018),
https://www.revealnews.org/article/for-people-of-color-banks-are-shutting-the-door-tohomeownership/ [https://perma.cc/555W-6E78].
95. Emily Badger, Who’s To Blame When Algorithms Discriminate?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/20/upshot/housing-discrimination-algorithmshud.html [https://perma.cc/6HWR-YDKV] (describing the research of law professor Myron
Orfield, who states that “[a] black household that makes $167,000 is less likely to qualify for a
prime loan [for a mortgage] than a white household that makes $40,000”); Robert Bartlett et al.,
Consumer-Lending Discrimination in the FinTech Era 6 (Nov. 2019) (unpublished manuscript),
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/morse/research/papers/discrim.pdf?_ga=2.106485891.10353701
51.1559599414-527767480.1559599414 [https://perma.cc/X7YN-VHXC]; Glantz & Martinez,
supra note 94 (reporting that an analysis of thirty-one million records showed minorities were
charged mortgage loans at higher rates than their white counterparts in sixty-one metro areas
“even when controlling for applicants’ income, loan amount and neighborhood”).
96. Bartlett et al., supra note 95, at 5. The study found that the fintech lenders discriminated
less than face-to-face lenders in terms of accepting minority applications. Id. at 6. This is a good
example of automated decision overcoming human biases.
97. Glantz & Martinez, supra note 94. HUD is proposing new regulations that would limit
the ability to challenge algorithmic screening used by landlords. See Badger, supra note 95.
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screening company that incorporates criminal record data in its reports. 98 The
plaintiffs allege that this practice reflects and compounds the effects of high
levels of policing in minority neighborhoods. 99 Indeed, screening tools that
include criminal record data disproportionately impact African Americans
and Hispanics (even though whites engage in similar rates of criminal
behavior), and reliance on these reports can leave people homeless or reduced
to living in substandard housing.100 The problem is compounded when, as in
the Connecticut case, the creator of the algorithm refuses to reveal
information about the source or details of the underlying criminal history
records, making it impossible for a landlord to consider—or a tenant to
challenge—whether the supposed criminal conduct at issue should be
disqualifying.101
Health Care. Health care analytics based on personal data can help guide
patient diagnosis and treatment, but they can also lead to digital
discrimination.102 The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act,
or HIPAA, aims to protect patient privacy by preventing health care providers
from unauthorized use or disclosure of patients’ medical data. 103 However,
HIPAA permits health care providers to share patient data with business
associates, and this means that Google can partner with Ascension, a health
care chain operating in twenty-one states, in order to collect and analyze the
health data of millions of Ascension patients without the knowledge or
consent of the patients or their doctors. 104 This partnership is raising concerns

98. Mark Pazniokas, A Tenant Blacklist, Compiled by Algorithm, CONN. MIRROR (Mar. 28,
2019),
https://ctmirror.org/2019/03/28/a-tenant-blacklist-compiled-by-algorithm/
[https://perma.cc/CJ58-H43U].
99. See id.
100. See Arroyo v. Corelogic, NAT’L HOUSING L. PROJECT (July 31, 2018),
https://www.nhlp.org/our-initiatives/arroyo-v-corelogic/ [https://perma.cc/ZF79-B37T].
101. See Pazniokas, supra note 98.
102. See generally Alvin Rajkomar et al., Ensuring Fairness in Machine Learning To
Advance Health Equity, 169 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 866 (2018); Linda Nordling, A Fairer Way
Forward
for
AI
in
Health
Care,
NATURE
(Sept.
25,
2019),
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-02872-2
[https://perma.cc/9MXP-RWNT];
Mohana Ravindranath, How Your Health Information Is Sold and Turned into ‘Risk Scores,’
POLITICO (Feb. 3, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/02/03/health-risk-scores-opioidabuse-1139978 [https://perma.cc/CW4U-J6AG].
103. Sharona Hoffman, What Genetic Testing Teaches About Predictive Health Analytics
Regulation, 98 N.C. L. REV. 123, 144 (2019).
104. Rob Copeland, Google’s ‘Project Nightingale’ Gathers Personal Health Data on
Millions of Americans, WALL STREET J. (Nov. 11, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/google-ssecret-project-nightingale-gathers-personal-health-data-on-millions-of-americans-11573496790
[https://perma.cc/BQ2S-7MZZ].
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about the security of patient data in light of prior data leaks at Google, as well
as how the data will be used, and possibly monetized. 105
HIPAA’s scope is also limited because much health care data exists
outside the scope of covered entities, such as data generated from website
searches, social media platforms, app usage, and fitness trackers. 106 There are
data brokers that gather this information and then sell “sick lists” to
companies that in turn use the information to market products to
consumers.107 For instance, one list of 4.7 million people is called “suffering
seniors,” and it includes people over fifty-five who supposedly suffer from
illnesses such as Alzheimer’s disease and depression. 108 Data brokers also sell
health profiles to insurers, who can then combine these profiles with
electronic medical records and other data sets to make predictions about
patient health.109 In one cautionary tale, a woman was denied insurance
because her prescription history revealed she was taking antidepressants. 110
There are companies that are generating risk scores based on health data and
selling those scores to doctors, insurers, and hospitals. 111 The market in
predictive health data is particularly pernicious for poor people, who have
higher rates of illnesses than the general population, and may thus face higher
insurance and borrowing rates, along with greater employer unwillingness to
105. Katherine Bindley, Your Health Data Isn’t as Safe as You Think, WALL STREET J. (Nov.
22,
2019),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/your-health-data-isnt-as-safe-as-you-think11574418606 [https://perma.cc/B9RQ-ER76].
106. See Hoffman, supra note 103, at 135; Frank Pasquale & Tara A. Ragone, Protecting
Health Privacy in an Era of Big Data Processing and Cloud Computing, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV.
595, 637 (2014) (“So many online activities have some implications about a person’s health status
that access to medical records is not necessary to construct a medical reputation.”); Nicolas P.
Terry, Protecting Patient Privacy in the Age of Big Data, 81 UMKC L. REV. 385, 405–06 (2012).
107. Aimee Picchi, The Creepy Side of Data Mining: Selling “Sick” Lists, CBS NEWS (Sept.
11, 2014), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-creepy-side-of-data-mining-selling-sick-lists/
[https://perma.cc/PGD6-AWD5].
108. Id.
109. Max N. Helveston, Reining in Commercial Exploitation of Consumer Data, 123 PENN
ST. L. REV. 667, 673 (2019) (“[T]he aggregation of massive amounts of consumers’ personal data
and advancements in AI-driven algorithmic learning have made it possible to derive almost
limitless correlations between individual characteristics and risk.”); Sharona Hoffman, Big Data
and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 777, 780–84 (2017); Marshall Allen,
Health Insurers Are Vacuuming Up Details About You—And It Could Raise Your Rates,
PROPUBLICA (July 17, 2018), https://www.propublica.org/article/health-insurers-are-vacuumingup-details-about-you-and-it-could-raise-your-rates [https://perma.cc/75W9-HTA8].
110. Pasquale & Ragone, supra note 106, at 634. Julie Brill, a former FTC Commissioner,
revealed that one data broker “reportedly sells the names, mailing addresses, and medication lists
of people with diseases like cancer or clinical depression. Another data broker . . . reportedly
offers lists of consumers, their credit scores, and their specific ailments” to marketers. Id. at 630.
111. See Ravindranath, supra note 102.
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hire them, as these businesses seek to cherry pick the healthiest people to
reduce their future costs.112
Criminal Justice. The criminal justice system is also turning to algorithms,
particularly in the realms of predictive policing, bail determinations, and
sentencing.113 The goal is to replace flawed human decision-making with
objective, scientific rigor, but the evidence shows that human biases remain
in computerized systems. These algorithms can compound the mass
incarceration of minorities, which among its many harms, depletes their
economic stability and reinforces poverty. 114 Police departments across the
country are using predictive policing software to identify crime hot spots as
well as likely offenders.115 Criminal justice critics charge that the software is
merely sending police back to locations with high numbers of arrests, thereby
creating a “self-reinforcing feedback loop”116 that “perpetuate[s] historical
biases in enforcement.”117
Algorithms are also used to conduct risk assessments that aim to determine
a defendant’s dangerousness; judges then use these scores in setting bail and
determining criminal sentences.118 Here too, an algorithm fed on historical
crime data will reinforce discriminatory patterns of law enforcement. 119 As
112. Hoffman, supra note 103, at 139–40; Allen, supra note 109. Hoffman notes that the
Americans with Disabilities Act does not apply to discriminatory predictions about future health
problems; it applies only to discrimination based on current health conditions. Hoffman, supra
note 103, at 150.
113. Sandra G. Mayson, Bias in, Bias out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218, 2227–32 (2019).
114. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010).
115. See FERGUSON, supra note 17; Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data
Policing, 52 GA. L. REV. 109, 113–14 (2017). Selbst discusses both place-based and people-based
predictive policing tools. Id. at 129–40.
116. Caroline Haskins, Academics Confirm Major Predictive Policing Algorithm Is
Fundamentally
Flawed,
VICE
(Feb.
14,
2019),
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/xwbag4/academics-confirm-major-predictive-policingalgorithm-is-fundamentally-flawed [https://perma.cc/F2KU-P53Z].
117. William Isaac & Kristian Lum, Setting the Record Straight on Predictive Policing and
Race, APPEAL (Jan. 3, 2018), https://theappeal.org/setting-the-record-straight-on-predictivepolicing-and-race-fe588b457ca2/ [https://perma.cc/QTT4-Q9JB]; see also Kristian Lum &
William Isaac, To Predict and Serve?, 13 SIGNIFICANCE 14, 18 (2016); Mayson, supra note 113,
at 2253 (“The choice to predict arrest has profound consequences for racial equity because in
most places, for nearly all crime categories, arrest rates have been racially disparate for
decades.”); Selbst, supra note 115, at 121; Dorothy E. Roberts, Digitizing the Carceral State, 132
HARV. L. REV. 1695, 1720 (2019) (book review).
118. Karen Hao, AI Is Sending People to Jail—and Getting It Wrong, MIT TECH. REV. (Jan.
21,
2019),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612775/algorithms-criminal-justice-ai
[https://perma.cc/8KHY-DDCV].
119. See id.
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Dorothy Roberts states, “Computerized risk assessments are based on data
taken from a social context that has already been shaped by hierarchies of
race, class, and gender.”120 A ProPublica investigative report found that a risk
assessment tool called COMPAS was predicting that black defendants pose
a higher risk of recidivism than they do (false positives), while underpredicting the risk for white defendants (false negatives). 121 A subsequent
study concluded that the algorithm was no better at predicting risk than
random people solicited for an internet survey. 122
COMPAS and similar recidivism prediction algorithms claim not to
include race as a factor, but they do include factors related to socioeconomic
status, such as public benefits receipt and high school grades. 123 The inclusion
of these data points “involves the state explicitly telling judges that poor
people should get longer sentences because they are poor—and, conversely,
that socioeconomic privilege should translate into leniency.” 124 Moreover,
these predictive algorithms lack transparency, and attempts to access their
underlying source code or model inevitably bump up against their makers’
claims that the algorithm is a protected trade secret, thus depriving defendants
of due process and any ability to counter the determinations. 125 This masks
the normative and policy choices embedded in algorithms. 126 On top of this,
algorithmic discrimination is further compounded by “automation bias”: the
psychological phenomenon in which human decision-makers overly defer to
computerized outputs due to their veneer of objectivity. 127 If judges do not
understand how algorithms work and their potential biases and errors, they
are likely to accede to computerized judgments.
Bias. Eliminating legally protected categories such as race and gender
from the data fed into algorithms does not magically solve the problem of
120. Roberts, supra note 117, at 1708.
121. Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu & Lauren Kirchner, Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA
(May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminalsentencing [https://perma.cc/ND3T-B68Q]. The creator of COMPAS, Northpointe, defended its
fairness, and this dispute has received wide coverage and analysis. See, e.g., Mayson, supra note
113, at 2234–37.
122. Julia Dressel & Hany Farid, The Accuracy, Fairness, and Limits of Predicting
Recidivism,
4
SCI.
ADVANCES
1,
3
(Jan.
17,
2018),
https://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/1/eaao5580 [https://perma.cc/EV4G-CR73].
123. Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of
Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 813 (2014).
124. Id. at 839.
125. See Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the
Criminal Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1368–71 (2018).
126. Berman, supra note 54, at 1331.
127. See Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249,
1271–72 (2008).
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bias, because those factors are associated with a range of other characteristics,
which serve as proxies.128 For example, race can be inferred from “neutral”
data such as zip codes, media preferences, or certain names. 129 When Amazon
rolled out same-day delivery service in twenty-seven metropolitan areas
across America, it excluded certain zip codes that were largely AfricanAmerican.130 Amazon claimed that it did not consider race; rather, its
algorithm was identifying zip codes with high concentrations of Prime
members and areas closest to its warehouses. 131 Yet even without an intent to
discriminate against minorities, the result was to disadvantage people who
already suffer from a lack of convenient and quality retail in their
neighborhoods.132 Similarly, a study revealed that a commercial health care
algorithm was identifying white patients for more intensive medical care than
similarly ill black patients.133 Why? The algorithm relied on data about past
health care expenditures to make predictions about patients’ future needs, but
black people suffer barriers to health care access and thus have lower cost
histories.134 By reformulating the algorithm to eliminate cost as a proxy for
needs, the racial bias disappeared. 135
These examples demonstrate how developers can bake structural biases
into algorithms, thereby “replicating real world inequalities” 136 even if they
have no intent to discriminate. So, as in the prior example, if black patients
have accrued lower health care costs over time, then the training data fed into
algorithms designed to identify health care needs will replicate these
128. See Betsy A. Williams, Catherine F. Brooks & Yotam Shmargad, How Algorithms
Discriminate Based on Data They Lack: Challenges, Solutions, and Policy Implications, 8 J. INFO.
POL’Y 78, 86, 90 (2018). The authors assert that social category data can be used productively to
uncover biases. Id. at 79 (“When such sensitive information is used responsibly and proactively,
ongoing discrimination can be made transparent through data-checking processes.”).
129. “When aiming to prevent race discrimination, for example, one may find that a host of
attributes in the United States correlate in some way with race. Some of those may be unexpected,
and some of those may be legitimate considerations for the decision.” Ignacio N. Cofone,
Algorithmic Discrimination Is an Information Problem, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 1389, 1415 (2019); see
also Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 93, at 193.
130. David Ingold & Spencer Soper, Amazon Doesn’t Consider the Race of Its Customers.
Should It?, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 21, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2016-amazonsame-day/index.html [https://perma.cc/8R9N-ZHHX].
131. Id.
132. Id. After this disparity was revealed in the media, Amazon responded by including those
zip codes into the same-day delivery service. Id.
133. Ziad Obermeyer et al., Dissecting Racial Bias in an Algorithm Used to Manage the
Health of Populations, 366 SCI. 447, 450 (2019).
134. Id. at 447.
135. Id. at 453.
136. See Chander, supra note 49, at 1039 (advocating for increased transparency for
algorithmic inputs and outputs).
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discriminatory trends. 137 (Training data is the subset of data fed into an
algorithm to teach the computer how to process information). 138 Because
human beings code software,139 developers can import their own unconscious
biases into the collection and selection of data—such as using training data
sets that are incomplete or that reflect structural inequities. 140 Bias can also
creep into algorithms when developers frame the desired outcomes of the
algorithm and when they select the features that the algorithm considers, both
of which necessarily involve value judgments.141 Tal Zarsky explains that
at some points, analysts must decide which correlations and patterns
should be incorporated into the scoring model and which must be
set aside as ‘junk,’ random results, or statistical errors. Here, the
analyst’s biases might shape the final outcome and the
discriminatory effect it will involve.”142

Moreover, because software engineers are primarily white men,143 these
judgments may be unintentionally skewed due to a circumscribed worldview.
As Cathy O’Neil succinctly states, “Models are opinions embedded in
mathematics.”144
B. Dirty Data and Careless Coding
Layered on top of these coding problems are widespread inaccuracies in
the data that developers select and feed into algorithms. We know a lot about
errors in credit reporting, because it is a regulated industry. In one study, the
FTC found that twenty percent of consumers identified mistakes in their
credit reports and that five percent of those reports contained errors serious

137. See Lillian Edwards & Michael Veale, Slave to the Algorithm? Why a ‘Right to an
Explanation’ Is Probably Not the Remedy You Are Looking For, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 18,
28 (2017).
138. See Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L.
REV. 671, 680 (2016).
139. Lehr & Ohm, supra note 48, at 660–61 (stressing the need for lawyers and policymakers
to recognize how humans shape machine learning systems).
140. Barocas and Selbst explain in detail the mechanisms by which data mining can result in
employment discrimination. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 138, at 677–93.
141. Karen Hao, This Is How AI Bias Really Happens—and Why It’s So Hard to Fix, MIT
TECH. REV. (Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612876/this-is-how-ai-biasreally-happensand-why-its-so-hard-to-fix/ [https://perma.cc/H9DC-6MMM].
142. Tal. Z. Zarsky, Understanding Discrimination in the Scored Society, 89 WASH. L. REV.
1375, 1391 (2014).
143. See Waldman, supra note 24, at 615.
144. O’NEIL, supra note 14, at 21.
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enough to lead to denials of credit or higher rates. 145 These errors fall
disproportionately on low-income consumers, who end up paying “higher
interest rates [at] less favorable terms.”146 As a result, “[s]cores can become
self-fulfilling prophecies, creating the financial distress they claim merely to
indicate.”147 Although there is a statutorily-mandated process to correct credit
reporting errors, it has been described as “Kafka-esque” due to its complexity
and non-responsiveness by the credit reporting agencies.148 Data inaccuracies
are even worse in the data broker industry, which operates without regulation
or any legally-mandated processes for transparency or correction. 149
Throughout the networked big data system, data errors are rife. 150
Algorithmic decision-making, with its attendant biases and inaccuracies,
also extends to government agencies, which interact extensively with lowincome people.151 Across the country, social service agencies are using
automated systems, both created in-house and purchased from private
vendors, to determine program eligibility and track compliance. 152 Automated
145. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, In FTC Study, Five Percent of Consumers Had
Errors on Their Credit Reports that Could Result in Less Favorable Terms for Loans (Feb. 11,
2013),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/02/ftc-study-five-percentconsumers-had-errors-their-credit-reports [https://perma.cc/FZ9B-UR2F]; see also Luke Herrine,
Credit Reporting’s Vicious Cycles, 40 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 305, 321 (2016) (stating
there are “more damaging errors for individuals with lower credit scores”).
146. Rebecca Kelly Slaughter, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at the CDIA Law &
Industry
Conference
4
(June
5,
2019),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1525705/slaughter__remarks_at_2019_cdia_law_industry_conference_6-5-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/4A4E-3E8N].
147. Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for
Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 18 (2014).
148. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, SUPERVISORY HIGHLIGHTS CONSUMER REPORTING
SPECIAL
EDITION
10–11
(2017),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201703_cfpb_Supervisory-HighlightsConsumer-Reporting-Special-Edition.pdf [https://perma.cc/QH7T-97SQ]; CHI CHI WU,
MICHAEL BEST & SARAH BOLLING MANCINI, AUTOMATED INJUSTICE REDUX 7, 13 (2019),
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/credit_reports/automated-injustice-redux.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XY5E-6EZW]; Letter from Americans for Financial Reform et al. to Maxine
Waters,
Chairwoman,
House
Fin.
Servs.
Comm.
1
(Dec.
9,
2019),
http://ourfinancialsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/2019.12.9-Support-letter-forProtecting-Your-Credit-Score-Act-Gottheimer.pdf [https://perma.cc/QWQ2-P3P3].
149. See John Lucker, Susan K. Hogan & Trevor Bischoff, Predictably Inaccurate: The
Prevalence and Perils of Bad Big Data, 21 DELOITTE REV. (July 31, 2017),
https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/deloitte-review/issue-21/analytics-bad-dataquality.html [https://perma.cc/936U-3U8A].
150. Sharona Hoffman, Big Data Analytics: What Can Go Wrong, 15 IND. HEALTH L. REV.
227, 230 (2018) (on errors in health data); Valentine, supra note 16, at 388.
151. Citron, supra note 127, at 1267.
152. Id. at 1263–64.
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decision-making has the potential to streamline access to services and
improve accuracy, but in some jurisdictions, the promise has been
outweighed by the peril.153 For instance, in the Medicaid context, several
states are adopting algorithms to determine levels of care for the disabled,
elderly, and poor.154 In their wake, thousands of disabled people have faced
reductions and terminations in aid and services without any explanation from
their state or opportunities for human intervention. 155 These technologicallydriven tragedies, which extend to welfare, food stamps, and other public
benefits programs, can be traced to the building of the algorithms. 156 Danielle
Citron explains that “[p]rogrammers routinely change the substance of rules
when translating them from human language into computer code.” 157 She
describes programmers in Colorado who, over a three-year period,
inaccurately translated at least nine hundred state regulatory requirements
into code, leading to hundreds of thousands of erroneous decisions, including
improper denials of health care to pregnant women, women with breast and
cervical cancer, and foster children, as well as improper denials of food
stamps to the disabled.158 Such problems extend far beyond Colorado. 159
In Idaho, a class action suit was filed after disabled people saw their
benefits slashed by as much as forty-two percent and could not get the state
to explain its reasons or process. 160 It turns out that, among other problems,
the state’s algorithmic model for apportioning funds was trained on and using
flawed and erroneous data.161 In Arkansas, a similar class action lawsuit
proved that the state’s algorithm for determining Medicaid eligibility was rife
with coding errors, such as inadvertently leaving out diabetes and improperly
weighing the severity of cerebral palsy, prompting the lead legal aid attorney

153. Valentine, supra note 16, at 378 (“The predictive algorithm systems that governments
rely on do not work as advertised and are far from infallible.”).
154. See Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Access to Algorithms, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1275–79
(2020).
155. See EUBANKS, supra note 45, at 39–83; Citron, supra note 127, at 1268–77.
156. See Lehr & Ohm, supra note 48, at 669–701 (describing eight steps involved in machine
learning and where programmers can go wrong).
157. Citron, supra note 127, at 1254.
158. Id. at 1256, 1268–69.
159. Id. at 1270–71 (discussing similar errors in California and Texas); Valentine, supra note
16, at 372–73 (discussing public benefits problems in New York City and Michigan).
160. Colin Lecher, What Happens When an Algorithm Cuts Your Health Care, VERGE (Mar.
21, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/3/21/17144260/healthcare-medicaid-algorithmarkansas-cerebral-palsy [https://perma.cc/NC7Y-GX7M].
161. FRY, supra note 34, at 17 (“[T]he data was so badly riddled with bugs and errors that it
was, for the most part, entirely useless”); Lecher, supra note 160.
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to query, “If states are using something so complex that they don’t understand
it, how do we know that it’s working right? What if there’s errors?” 162
And, once algorithms are up and running, these problems are compounded
by computer system failures;163 reductions in staff;164 lack of caseworker
training;165 decentralized case oversight;166 loss of verification documentation
provided by claimants;167 pressures on case workers to close cases in order to
meet performance metrics;168 processing delays;169 lack of adequate notice to
claimants, who are thus denied the chance to object or appeal; 170 incorrect
instructions to clients;171 and decentralized case oversight.172 Poor people face
extreme surveillance in public benefits systems, but it is a one-way street with
inadequate oversight over the government’s use of algorithmic decisionmaking.
Algorithms are also compounding the consequences of poverty. For
instance, child welfare agencies are increasingly using predictive software to
determine which claims of child neglect or abuse to investigate further and
which to drop.173 These algorithms are more likely to sweep low-income
families into their orbit, because they incorporate and emphasize data
generated from programs associated almost exclusively with poor people,
such as public benefits receipt and interaction with juvenile probation and
youth services.174 By contrast, middle class families gather family support
privately, from therapists, doctors, private rehabilitation programs, and
nannies and babysitters. This is the “missing” data that never gets fed into
child welfare algorithms. Not surprisingly, the predictions generated from
these algorithms are inaccurate, with high rates of false positives, which can
devastate families when children are torn from their parents.175
Virginia Eubanks names these government surveillance technologies “the
digital poorhouse”; it’s a place where “poor and working-class people are
targeted by new tools of digital poverty management and face life-threatening
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Lecher, supra note 160.
EUBANKS, supra note 45, at 49, 63.
Valentine, supra note 16, at 391.
EUBANKS, supra note 45, at 50, 63.
Id. at 61–62.
Id. at 50.
Id.
Id. at 53.
Id. at 54.
Id. at 71.
Id. at 61–62.
Id. at 127–73.
Id. at 146–47, 156–57; Valentine, supra note 16, at 385.
See Valentine, supra note 16, at 380–81.
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consequences as a result.”176 It is a place where technology obscures
governmental decision-making and strips people’s ability to understand or
challenge the forces that control their lives.
C. Surveillance
Algorithms underlie a wide range of surveillance systems. Facial
recognition technology, which uses machine learning algorithms to identify
distinctive details about a person’s face in order to match them within an
existing database,177 is expanding. Law enforcement agencies are using facial
recognition, typically without notice to the public or local lawmakers, to
identify arrestees by matching their photos with those contained in multiple
databases, such as drivers’ license records, mugshots, and social media. 178
Over half of American adults are in law enforcement facial recognition
databases.179 At the same time, there are growing commercial applications for
facial recognition, such as in stores and stadiums, which employ the
technology to enhance security and to learn more about consumers. 180
In 2019, a landlord of a building serving low-income tenants in New York
decided to replace keys with facial recognition software, thus angering
residents who were concerned that the landlord would share their data with
the police and use the data to push out tenants in order to gentrify the
property.181 Public housing authorities are similarly adopting facial
176. EUBANKS, supra note 45, at 11.
177. Mariko Hirose, Privacy in Public Spaces: The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
Against the Dragnet Use of Facial Recognition Technology, 49 CONN. L. REV. 1591, 1596 (2017).
178. Catherine Crump, Surveillance Policy Making by Procurement, 91 WASH. U. L. REV.
1595, 1604 (2016); Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, How the Police Use Facial Recognition and
Where
It
Falls
Short,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
12,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/12/technology/facial-recognition-police.html
[https://perma.cc/Y4NP-6FZ3].
179. Clare Garvie, Alvaro Bedoya & Jonathan Frankle, The Perpetual Line-Up: Unregulated
Police Face Recognition in America, GEO. L. CTR. ON PRIVACY & TECH. (Oct. 18, 2016),
https://www.perpetuallineup.org/ [https://perma.cc/2PPG-AQW7].
180. See Jeff John Roberts, The Business of Your Face, FORTUNE (Mar. 27, 2019),
https://fortune.com/longform/facial-recognition/ [https://perma.cc/KN2S-SZBS].
181. Ultimately, the landlord dropped the plan, and several of the residents are advocating
for legislative bans on the technology. See Alfred Ng, Tenants Call for Better Laws After Stopping
Facial Recognition from Moving In, CNET (Nov. 22, 2019), https://www.cnet.com/news/tenantscall-for-better-laws-after-stopping-facial-recognition-from-moving-in/ [https://perma.cc/VL3YNL69]. See also Erin McElroy, Disruption at the Doorstep, URB. OMNIBUS (Nov. 6, 2019),
https://urbanomnibus.net/2019/11/disruption-at-the-doorstep/ [https://perma.cc/UV3F-37M6].
McElroy discusses the rise of “proptech” in which real estate technology companies are impacting
the “provision, consumption, and management of residential space.” Id.
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recognition, ostensibly to enhance security, while making the daily activities
and movements of low-income, minority people available to law
enforcement.182 High-income residents have been more welcoming of facial
recognition technology for the sense of security it provides and the gee-whiz
nature of new technology.183 Yet low-income tenants are more wary because
they face more serious consequences from surveillance, such as eviction and
entanglement with the criminal justice system.184 This highlights how the
same technology can have differential impacts on different groups—a
comparison aptly described as luxury surveillance versus imposed
surveillance.185
Facial recognition technology has also been used to target people of color
who are engaging in constitutionally protected speech. During the 2015
protests in Baltimore City over the death of Freddie Gray while in police
custody, the Baltimore City Police Department used facial recognition
technology to identify and arrest protesters based on their social media
postings.186 Such surveillance impinges on Americans’ right to freedom of
assembly,187 and it disproportionately impacts people of color.188 It also flips
democratic accountability, “with the supervisor now the supervised,” which
in turn “harms individuals’ perceptions of themselves as citizens in a
182. See Lola Fadulu, Facial Recognition Technology in Public Housing Prompts Backlash,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/24/us/politics/facialrecognition-technology-housing.html [https://perma.cc/6GS3-RYD5].
183. Kashmir Hill, Before Clearview Became a Police Tool, It Was a Secret Plaything of the
Rich, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/05/technology/clearviewinvestors.html [https://perma.cc/2UHS-MTJU].
184. See Chris Gilliard, The Two Faces of the Smart City, FAST COMPANY (Jan. 20, 2020),
https://www.fastcompany.com/90453305/the-two-faces-of-the-smart-city
[https://perma.cc/2P7X-2WWN]; McElroy, supra note 181 (noting that “real estate and
technology platforms [proptech included] often work in conjunction to displace and target poor
and working class tenants of color”).
185. Gilliard, supra note 184.
186. Benjamin Powers, Eyes over Baltimore: How Police Use Military Technology To
Secretly
Track
You,
ROLLING
STONE
(Jan.
6,
2017),
https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-features/eyes-over-baltimore-how-police-usemilitary-technology-to-secretly-track-you-126885/ [https://perma.cc/LC5N-4KVT]; see Sidney
Fussell, The Strange Politics of Facial Recognition, ATLANTIC (June 28, 2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2019/06/democrats-and-republicans-passingsoft-regulations/592558/ [https://perma.cc/73G6-KXWZ].
187. Crump, supra note 178, at 1644 (“Surveillance technology may go beyond deterring
conduct that is unlawful and inhibit or deter the legal and beneficial activities that citizens conduct
in a free society.”).
188. Powers, supra note 186. Powers also describes how the Baltimore City Police
Department deployed aerial surveillance cameras attached to planes for months without alerting
the city’s citizens or local lawmakers.
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democratic society.”189 Poverty already depresses democratic participation,
thus feeding a growing economic divide as laws are passed to benefit the
wealthy, while leaving poor Americans behind. 190
Further, facial recognition technology is problematic for its lack of
accuracy, especially for women and people of color. For instance, researchers
Joy Buolamwini and Timnit Gebru found an error rate of up to 34.4 percent
points higher for darker skinned females than lighter skinned males, raising
the risk of wrongful arrests and mistaken identity.191 But even as the software
becomes more accurate,192 the technology remains largely unregulated, does
not require reasonable suspicion before police access it, lacks protections
against misuse, and usually operates without public knowledge. 193 A few
states and cities have passed laws limiting the use of facial recognition, and
there is increasing bi-partisan support to regulate the technology, 194 but it
remains legal in the vast majority of jurisdictions and for unlimited
purposes.195
189. Craig Konnoth, An Expressive Theory of Privacy Intrusions, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1533,
1570 (2017).
190. Daniel Weeks, Poverty vs. Democracy in America, ATLANTIC (Jan. 6, 2014),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/01/poverty-vs-democracy-in-america/282809
[https://perma.cc/MTE3-XN4J].
191. Joy Buolamwini & Timnit Gebru, Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy Disparities
in Commercial Gender Classification, 81 PROC. MACHINE LEARNING RES. 1, 8 (2018). Likewise,
the ACLU conducted a study of Amazon’s facial recognition tool that falsely identified twentyeight members of Congress as criminals based on matching their faces with a mugshot database,
and representatives of color were far more likely to be subject to the false match. Jacob Snow,
Amazon’s Face Recognition Falsely Matched 28 Members of Congress with Mugshots, ACLU
(July
26,
2018),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/surveillancetechnologies/amazons-face-recognition-falsely-matched-28 [https://perma.cc/5WCH-N59L].
192. Increased accuracy is not inevitable because larger datasets heighten the odds of people
matching with other people. Jennifer Lynch, Face Off: Law Enforcement Use of Face Recognition
Technology, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.eff.org/wp/lawenforcement-use-face-recognition#_idTextAnchor005 [https://perma.cc/4PEJ-LC3D].
193. Garvie et al., supra note 179; George Joseph & Kenneth Lipp, IMB Used NYPD
Surveillance Footage To Develop Technology that Lets Police Search by Skin Color, INTERCEPT
(Sept. 6, 2018), https://theintercept.com/2018/09/06/nypd-surveillance-camera-skin-tone-search/
[https://perma.cc/4RP4-43DJ].
194. Fussell, supra note 186.
195. The Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act, which applies only to private
companies, requires consumer consent and public notice about collection and sharing of biometric
data. Stuart D. Levi et al., Illinois Supreme Court Holds that Biometric Privacy Law Does Not
Require
Actual
Harm
for
Private
Suits,
SKADDEN
(Jan.
29,
2019),
https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2019/01/illinois-supreme-court
[https://perma.cc/SE5T-Z9T9]. Oklahoma prohibits the state from sharing biometric data with the
federal government. See Mark Lerner, Real ID and the Battle that Still Goes On in Oklahoma and
Other States, CONST. ALLIANCE (Dec. 15, 2014), https://constitutionalalliance.org/real-id-and-
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Surveillance systems are also endemic in the workplace; 196 employers use
them to improve productivity, cut costs, make management and personnel
decisions, reduce employee theft and rule breaking, limit litigation, and
protect proprietary information.197 As technology advances, so does
monitoring of employees.198 In the workplace, employers monitor employees
with tools such as thumb scans, identification badges, closed circuit cameras,
geolocation tracking, sensors on tablets and vehicles, and software that can
analyze employees’ tones of voice and facial expressions.199 Employers can
also examine employees’ internet browsing histories, social media usage,
emails, phone calls, use of productivity apps, and keynote strokes. 200 Many
employers offer wellness programs, which track employees’ health and
lifestyle choices, including their fertility and pregnancies, via fitness trackers
and smartphone apps.201 Moreover, algorithms shape the daily experiences of
workers as they are monitored and then nudged to the business’s desired

the-battle-that-still-goes-on-in-oklahoma-and-other-states/
[https://perma.cc/3ATB-PVJ9].
Oregon bars facial recognition in combination with body cameras. Susan Crawford, Facial
Recognition Laws Are (Literally) All Over the Map, WIRED (Dec. 16, 2019),
https://www.wired.com/story/facial-recognition-laws-are-literally-all-over-the-map/
[https://perma.cc/24Z4-AAAD].
196. See Ifeoma Ajunwa, Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Limitless Worker Surveillance,
105 CALIF. L. REV. 735, 738–39 (2017); Alexandra Mateescu & Aiha Nguyen, Explainer:
Workplace Monitoring & Surveillance, DATA & SOC’Y (Feb. 2019), https://datasociety.net/wpcontent/uploads/2019/02/DS_Workplace_Monitoring_Surveillance_Explainer.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8RS7-PACC].
197. See Michele E. Gilman, The Class Differential in Privacy Law, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 1389,
1408 (2012); Alex Rosenblat, Tamara Kneese & Danah Boyd, Workplace Surveillance 1, 3–5
(Oct.
8,
2014)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://www.datasociety.net/pubs/fow/WorkplaceSurveillance.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z8ZNE9Z9]; see also The Latest on Workplace Monitoring and Surveillance, AM. MGMT. ASS’N (Apr.
8, 2019), https://www.amanet.org/articles/the-latest-on-workplace-monitoring-and-surveillance/
[https://perma.cc/XZ7Y-K62X] (reporting that one quarter of employers have fired workers for
misusing email and one third have fired workers for internet misuse).
198. Ajunwa et al., supra note 196, at 738.
199. Id. at 743–44; see Ellen Ruppel Shell, The Employer-Surveillance State, ATLANTIC (Oct.
15,
2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2018/10/employeesurveillance/568159/ [https://perma.cc/ANK8-FKAG]. On biometric surveillance in the
workplace, see Mateescu & Nguyen, supra note 196, at 7–9.
200. Ajunwa et al., supra note 196, at 743–44.
201. Id. at 763; Drew Harwell, Is Your Pregnancy App Sharing Your Intimate Data with Your
Boss?,
WASH.
POST
(Apr.
10,
2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/04/10/tracking-your-pregnancy-an-appmay-be-more-public-than-you-think/ [https://perma.cc/A4W5-EPCW] (describing the new
employer tools of “menstrual surveillance”).
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behaviors.202 There can be serious consequences from workplace
surveillance, including physical and mental health problems resulting from
the stress of surveillance, a loss of worker dignity and sense of autonomy,
chilling of collective action, discrimination, and lower wages. 203 Surveillance
is most oppressive and widespread in the low-wage workforce, making it a
key issue to economic justice.204
Children are also increasingly surveilled. School districts across the
country are purchasing software that monitors students’ social media and
online activity, both inside and outside of school, in an attempt to increase
school safety in the wake of mass violence incidents. 205 This raises concerns
about suppression of student speech and self-development, as well as the
consequences of misinterpretation of student slang, pop culture references,
and non-English speakers.206 Moreover, children of color already face higher
levels of school discipline, which may be amplified by monitoring
technology that could “disproportionately tag students of color as
dangerous.”207 Meanwhile, there is no solid evidence that surveillance

202. See ALEX ROSENBLAT, UBERLAND: HOW ALGORITHMS ARE REWRITING THE RULES OF
WORK 4 (2018) (“Drivers are supposedly free and independent, but Uber’s rules, enforced by
these algorithmic managers, signiﬁcantly limit the opportunities for entrepreneurial decision
making available to them.”).
203. See Charlotte Garden, Labor Organizing in the Age of Surveillance, 63 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
55, 65–67 (2018); Gilman, supra note 197, at 1408–09; Pauline T. Kim, Data Mining and the
Challenges of Protecting Employee Privacy, 40 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 405, 418 (2019);
Nathan Newman, Reengineering Workplace Bargaining: How Big Data Drives Lower Wages and
How Reframing Labor Law Can Restore Information Equality in the Workplace, 85 U. CIN. L.
REV. 693, 716–19 (2017).
204. Gilman, supra note 197, at 1400; Wendi S. Lazar & Nantiya Ruan, Is There a Future
for Work?, 25 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 343, 351–52 (2018); Tracy L. Vargas, Employees
or Suspects? Surveillance and Scrutinization of Low-Wage Service Workers in U.S. Dollar Stores,
20 J. LAB. & SOC’Y 207, 210, 208 (2017) (“[R]epressive forms of worker surveillance are most
prevalent in non-unionized retail settings where labor organization is weak or absent, where work
is disproportionately performed by ‘unskilled’ workers, women, minorities, and immigrants, and
where job tasks can be easily measured.”).
205. Barbara Fedders, The Constant and Expanding Classroom: Surveillance in K-12 Public
Schools, 97 N.C. L. Rev. 1673, 1680–98 (2019); Lois Beckett, Under Digital Surveillance: How
American Schools Spy on Millions of Kids, GUARDIAN (Oct. 22, 2019),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/22/school-student-surveillance-bark-gaggle
[https://perma.cc/B8VN-YCE6]; Faiza Patel & Rachel Levinson-Waldman, School Surveillance
Zone, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Apr. 30, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/ourwork/research-reports/school-surveillance-zone [https://perma.cc/C3EC-R4JE].
206. Patel & Levinson-Waldman, supra note 205.
207. Id. For other forms of student tracking, see Heather Kelly, School Apps Track Students
from Classroom to Bathroom, and Parents are Struggling to Keep Up, WASH. POST (Oct. 29,
2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/10/29/school-apps-track-students-
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technology improves student safety.208 This is one of many ways in which the
consequences of surveillance systems can fall most harshly on the poor.
D. Conclusion
A lack of data privacy enables heightened surveillance and sorting of lowincome and other marginalized people. There are economic impacts, as
people lose opportunities that are necessary for financial stability, such as
housing, employment, mainstream financial services, and education, while
facing higher levels of interaction with the criminal justice and child welfare
systems. Marion Fourcade and Kieran Healy explain how digital sorting
systems capture behavior and thus embed moral judgements of their subjects:
“Bad luck in missing a payment, or good fortune in having a parent who will
pay a bill, get coded as poor or wise personal choices. One’s score falls or
rises accordingly.”209 This classification economy also has dignitary harms,
as people lose autonomy over their own lives and are manipulated towards
the ends of profiteers. As one of the tenants protesting facial recognition said,
“We’re saying we don’t want this; we’ve had enough. We should not feel like
we’re in a prison to enter our homes.”210
While much modern data collection and surveillance is covert and
invisible, low-income people are particularly subject to overt surveillance
designed not only to observe them but also to let them know they are being
watched, such as law enforcement and workplace cameras. This sort of
intrusion “signals disrespect to its victims and suggests to others that the
victim lacks social standing and regard relative to other groups and
institutions in society.”211
At its most extreme, surveillance systems are driving marginalized people
underground, where they remain disconnected from services and supports
that could otherwise assist them.212 A prime example of this problem of
hyper-invisibility due to extreme privacy befalls undocumented people in the
United States.213 Due to fears about the federal government’s technologicallyfueled surveillance dragnet, they are pulling children out of schools, declining
classroom-bathroom-parents-are-struggling-keep-up/?arc404=true
[https://perma.cc/72JSLDVU].
208. Beckett, supra note 205.
209. Fourcade & Healy, supra note 33, at 24–25.
210. Misra, supra note 18.
211. Konnoth, supra note 189, at 153.
212. See Michele Gilman & Rebecca Green, The Surveillance Gap: The Harms of Extreme
Privacy and Data Marginalization, 42 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 253, 254–55 (2018).
213. Id. at 261–65.
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to go to hospitals, and not applying for food stamps and other public benefits
for which they are eligible.214 They are becoming invisible. In sum, lowincome people live at both extreme ends of the digital privacy spectrum, and
existing laws do little to help them calibrate their privacy needs.
III.

THE GAPS IN AMERICAN PRIVACY PROTECTIONS

Unlike the EU, the United States lacks a comprehensive privacy law
regime. Our privacy protections are scattered among constitutional
provisions, statutes, and the common law, as this Part surveys. Overall, in
America, privacy is considered a good rather than a right, and as a result,
privacy from companies has come to be discussed as a commodity
or a privilege that individuals should always have the prerogative to
give up, while regulation that in any way inhibits their ability to do
so is frequently decried as paternalistic and anti-innovation.215

This Part surveys the privacy law landscape in the United States as it relates
to people with low socio-economic status.
A. Constitution
At the constitutional level, privacy rights have developed to promote
individual autonomy in family and bodily integrity, but the Constitution is
less protective of our personal data.216 Given the government’s power,
combined with its extensive databases of personal information, a
constitutional right to informational privacy—or the right to keep the
government from collecting and disclosing our personal information—could
be significant, particularly for poor people.217 It could restrict and enhance
safeguards for the extensive database sharing that occurs among federal
agencies, states, and private entities. Yet the Supreme Court has never held
that the Fourteenth Amendment protects informational privacy. 218 Rather, the
Court has ruled that even if such a right exists, it was not violated under the
facts of the handful of cases before it, largely because of adequate statutory
214. Id. at 264–65.
215. Barrett, supra note 28, at 1065–66. On the differences in philosophy between the U.S.
and EU approaches, see generally Paul M. Schwartz & Karl-Nikolaus Peifer, Transatlantic Data
Privacy Law, 106 GEO. L.J. 115 (2017).
216. See Gilman, supra note 197, at 1417.
217. See Danielle Keats Citron, Comment, A Poor Mother’s Right to Privacy: A Review, 98
B.U. L. REV. 1139, 1156 (2018).
218. NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134 (2011); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
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protections against disclosure in those cases.219 Thus, any defined
constitutional right to informational privacy will have to wait until a later
date.220
The Fourth Amendment is another potential bulwark against the
government’s collection and use of personal data; it protects citizens from
unreasonable government searches and seizures. 221 Under the reasonableness
touchstone, the Court has long held that objectively reasonable expectations
to privacy are shed when people voluntarily share information with third
parties (the “third-party” doctrine)222 or in public.223 Thus, sending emails or
stepping outside your front door waives any reasonable expectation to
privacy.224 In a shift from this doctrine, the Court ruled in 2018 in Carpenter
v. United States that a warrantless police search of cell phone site data
violated the Fourth Amendment.225 In so doing, the Court acknowledged the
tension between the third-party doctrine and emerging technologies, which
government can use to track people’s lives at a granular level, over lengthy
periods of time.226 The Court ruled that the third-party doctrine did not apply

219. NASA, 562 U.S. at 147; Whalen, 429 U.S. at 601–02.
220. Lower courts have been more receptive to information privacy claims based on the
Constitution. Citron, supra note 217, at 1150. At the same time, data processors have turned to
the First Amendment and constitutional standing doctrine to argue for the free flow of data.
Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 215, at 134–35.
221. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The purpose of the Fourth Amendment “is to safeguard the
privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.”
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018) (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387
U.S. 523 (1967)).
222. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979).
223. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). For analysis, see Andrew Guthrie
Ferguson, The “Smart” Fourth Amendment, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 547, 570–71 (2017). For
subsequent Supreme Court cases struggling to adapt its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to
emerging technologies, see Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 386 (2014) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment requires police to obtain a warrant to search a smartphone incident to arrest); United
States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012) (holding that warrantless police placement of GPS on
suspect’s car for twenty-eight days violates the Fourth Amendment under a trespass theory); Kyllo
v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35–37 (2001) (holding that a warrant is required for use of a thermal
imaging camera on a home).
224. See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 526 (2006)
(explaining that under the Court’s third-party doctrine “if information is possessed or known by
third parties, then, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, an individual lacks a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the information.”). The result of the third-party doctrine is that it
“undermines Fourth Amendment protection for most data trails.” Ferguson, supra note 223, at
576.
225. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223.
226. Id. at 2219–20.
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to cell phone site data because cell phones are a necessity of modern life, and
users have no choice in being tracked.227
The reach of Carpenter beyond its narrow context remains to be seen. 228
Is there a reasonable expectation that government will not access data held in
commercial databases given the notice-and-consent regime that currently
governs personal data?229 How broad is the Court’s notion of voluntary
consent? Unfortunately, the Court has long held that poor people give up their
reasonable expectations to privacy, even in their homes, when they seek
governmental assistance.230 If low-income people can lawfully be subject to
investigatory home visits as a condition of receiving welfare benefits, it is
hard to see how they can block government from accessing their data to
manage public benefits regimes. Thus, the Fourth Amendment may serve a
bulwark to deeply intrusive and warrantless uses of technology in police
hands, but right now it probably has little to offer low-income people in terms
of big data networks.231
B. Privacy Statutes
At the statutory level, American privacy laws are fragmented and sectoral,
meaning they cover specific industries, such as health care providers or
financial services companies, or specific forms of data, such as children’s
online activity.232 Even within industries, these federal, sectoral laws are
limited in their scope and effect, 233 and there is often a mismatch between
their objectives and technological reality. “Privacy law is primarily
concerned with causality, whereas Big Data is generally a tool of

227. Id.
228. Orin S. Kerr, Implementing Carpenter, in THE DIGITAL FOURTH AMENDMENT (Oxford
U.
Press)
(forthcoming),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3301257
[https://perma.cc/KZ5H-6USK].
229. Susan Freiwald & Stephen Wm. Smith, The Carpenter Chronicle: A Near-Perfect
Surveillance, 132 HARV. L. REV. 205, 230–31 (2018).
230. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 313–25 (1971). For extended analysis of Wyman, see
Michele E. Gilman, Privacy as a Luxury Not for the Poor: Wyman v. James (1971), in THE
POVERTY LAW CANON (Ezra Rosser & Marie Failinger eds., 2016).
231. See Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 215, at 133.
232. See Barrett, supra note 28, at 1068; Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 215, at 136; Daniel
J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L.
REV. 583, 587 (2014); cf. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 10, at 381 (noting the benefits of a sectoral
approach to be more tailored to specific risks).
233. See Barrett, supra note 28, at 1069.
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correlation.”234 Three examples of major consumer-oriented privacy laws are
illustrative.235
HIPPA protects patient health information collected by health care
providers such as doctors,236 but health information shared outside covered
contexts remains fair game for data brokers and other end users. 237 That is
why a search for “diabetes” on Google can ultimately result in a person
paying a higher health insurance premium, why marketers can target sick
people with advertising, or why a hospital can rely on a credit report to predict
a patient’s compliance with a medication regime.238
In the financial realm, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) requires
financial institutions to explain their information-sharing practices to
customers and to safeguard sensitive data.239 However, consumers must
affirmatively opt out if they do not want their information shared. 240 This puts
the onus on individuals to protect their privacy, 241 which can be challenging

234. Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework To
Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 108 (2014).
235. For an overview of the various American privacy laws that govern the private sector,
see CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 27; Neil M. Richards, Andrew B. Serwin & Tyler Blake,
Understanding American Privacy, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PRIVACY & DATA PROTECTION
LAW: VALUES, NORMS AND GLOBAL POLITICS (Gloria González Fuster, Rosamunde van Brakel
&
Paul
De
Hert
eds.)
(forthcoming),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3256918 [https://perma.cc/7L9H-DL6N];
Shawn Marie Boyne, Data Protection in the United States, 66 AM. J. COMP. L. 299 (2018).
236. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110
Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in various sections of Titles 18, 26, 29, and 42 of the United
States Code).
237. See Mary F.E. Eberling, Uncanny Commodities: Policy and Compliance Implications
for the Trade in Debt and Health Data, 27 ANNALS HEALTH L. 125, 128 (2018); Pasquale &
Ragone, supra note 106, at 629–30.
238. See Eberling, supra note 237, at 134–49.
239. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in
Titles 12 and 15 of the United States Code). The Act was signed into law in 1999 with the purpose
“to enhance competition in the financial services industry by providing a prudential framework
for the affiliation of banks, securities firms, insurance companies, and other financial service
providers.” See H.R. REP. NO. 106-434 (1999) (Conf. Rep.).
240. See 15 U.S.C. § 6802(b)(1) (2018).
241. The
Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act,
ELECTRONIC
PRIVACY
INFO.
CTR.,
https://www.epic.org/privacy/glba/ [https://perma.cc/F3TG-UCAT]; see also Kathleen A.
Hardee, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act: Five Years After Implementation, Does the Emperor Wear
Clothes?, 39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 915, 926 (2006) (“Yet in the end, individual consumers have
not yet realized any significant increase in protection from the handling, or mishandling, of their
confidential financial information as a result of the GLBA.”); Edward J. Janger & Paul M.
Schwartz, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Information Privacy, and the Limits of Default Rules,
86 MINN. L. REV. 1219, 1230–32 (2002) (summarizing critiques of the Act).
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given the complexity of the GLBA notices. 242 In addition, the GLBA permits
sharing of personal data between corporate affiliates, which can include a
large web of financial and non-financial businesses.243 Furthermore, GLBA
enforcement is entirely within the government’s hands; there is no private
right of action.244 Meanwhile, companies like Facebook and Google are not
financial institutions and can thus trade freely in financial information. 245
The Fair Credit and Reporting Act aims to promote fairness, accuracy, and
privacy in the consumer reporting industry.246 These reports are used widely
in lending, insurance, and housing contexts.247 Consumers have rights under
FCRA to view their reports and their credit scores, dispute incorrect or
incomplete data, be advised when information has been used against them,
and consent before reports are shared with employers. 248 However, data
brokers largely evade FCRA’s coverage, as do any household or
neighborhood level determinations.249 Moreover, while FCRA aims at
ensuring the reporting of accurate information, it does nothing to protect
against inaccurate inferences that end-users such as employers or landlords
derive from reports.250 It also does not protect information that employers
gather directly from their workplace surveillance systems. 251
242. See David Walrath, Privacy and Information Disclosure: An Economic Analysis of the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 24 POL’Y PERSPECTIVES 55, 59–60 (2017).
243. Paul J. Polking & Scott A. Cammarn, Overview of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 4 N.C.
BANKING INST. 1, 6 (2000).
244. See Borinski v. Williamson, No. Civ.A. 3:02–CV–1014, 2004 WL 433746, at *3 (N.D.
Tex. Mar. 1, 2004); see also Lacerte Software Corp. v. Prof. Tax Serv., L.L.C., No. Civ.3:03–
CV–1551–H, 2004 WL 180321, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2004).
245. See Barrett, supra note 28, at 1070. Further, many low-income people are unbanked,
and thus this Act has little relevance to them in any event. See Kristin Johnson, Frank Pasquale
& Jennifer Chapman, Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning, and Bias in Finance: Toward
Responsible Innovation, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 499, 500–01 (2019) (noting that thirty-three
million households in the United States are unbanked or underbanked).
246. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2018).
247. 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
248. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681g(a)(1), 1681g(c); 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A).
249. See Hertza, supra note 87, at 1728–29; Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 93, at 186–87.
The Act also excludes information compiled directly by a lender. Hurley & Adebayo, supra note
93, at 186–87.
250. See Kim, supra note 203, at 418; Madden et al., supra note 19, at 87. In addition, the
Ninth Circuit concluded in 2019 in a ruling upholding a preliminary injunction in favor of a data
broker that it could scrape data from public websites without violating the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2018), which makes it a crime to access a computer “without
authorization.” HiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 938 F.3d 985, 1001 (9th Cir. 2019). The court
ruled that a data broker that scraped data from LinkedIn was likely to succeed on the merits with
the claim that it did not “circumvent[ ] a computer’s generally applicable rules regarding access
permissions.” Id. at 1003.
251. Kim, supra note 203, at 417–18.
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With regard to government-held data, the Privacy Act of 1974 is a code of
fair information practices that governs how the federal government manages
the information it holds about individuals.252 The Act aims to restrict agency
disclosure of personal data, to give individuals access to government records
containing their information and the right to amend inaccurate or irrelevant
records, and to establish norms for agency collection, maintenance, and
dissemination of records.253 However, the Act has numerous loopholes and
has not kept pace with advances in modern technology, particularly given the
massive sharing of information between public and private databases. 254 Also,
while the Privacy Act and similar state analogues govern the government’s
storage and disclosure of information, they have not constrained the
government’s manner of collecting information from poor people in ways
that are often stigmatizing and degrading, using methods such as intrusive
questioning,255 fingerprinting, and drug-testing as a condition of receiving
public benefits.256 The Privacy Act also contains an exception for
nonconsensual disclosure of information to law enforcement; as a result,
“when a population is imagined to be inclined toward criminality, then that
population exists in a state of exception under the Privacy Act.” 257 Data
gathered from these intrusive practices is then fed into government databases
and shared with state agencies, including law enforcement, leading to the
further criminalization of poverty.258 In sum, privacy statutes provide limited
protections against emerging privacy harms and their associated economic
injustices.

252. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2018).
253. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OVERVIEW OF THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 4 (2015 ed.)
https://www.justice.gov/opcl/file/793026/download [https://perma.cc/P2WP-F5AV].
254. See id. at 1; Jonathan C. Bond, Note, Defining Disclosure in a Digital Age: Updating
the Privacy Act for the Twenty-First Century, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1232, 1245–46 (2008).
255. See KHIARA M. BRIDGES, REPRODUCING RACE—AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF PREGNANCY AS
A SITE OF RACIALIZATION 45–48 (2011); Jenna McLaughlin, Pregnant, on Medicaid, and Being
Watched, INTERCEPT (Apr. 7, 2016), https://theintercept.com/2016/04/07/pregnant-on-medicaidand-being-watched/ [https://perma.cc/29ZG-TEJU] (interviewing Khiara Bridges, who states
what information patients must provide to access federalized, subsidized health care, including
topics “from sexual abuse, to intimate partner violence, to how often they ate, what they ate, how
they make their money, [and] how their partner makes their money.”).
256. See Gilman, supra note 197, at 1422–23.
257. KHIARA M. BRIDGES, THE POVERTY OF PRIVACY RIGHTS 161 (2017).
258. Gilman & Green, supra note 212, at 257; Kaaryn Gustafson, The Criminalization of
Poverty, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 674–78 (2009).
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C. Notice and Consent
Outside of sectoral privacy statutes, the United States relies on selfregulation by companies that collect and use data and puts the burden on
consumers to protect their own data.259 This notice and consent approach
seeks to provide consumers with information about a mobile app or website’s
privacy policy, including its collection, use, and sharing policies, in order to
allow the consumer to decide whether or not to engage with the app or site. 260
Theoretically, this provides consumers with autonomy, while encouraging
tech companies to innovate. Practically, however, it fails to protect
consumers because it is founded on a myth of a fair contractual bargain
between providers and consumers.
Numerous studies show that consumers do not read privacy policies
because they are lengthy and rife with legalese and incomprehensible
jargon.261 This is an even greater challenge for less educated consumers, who
are more likely to be low-income and who disproportionately—and
mistakenly—trust that privacy policies will keep their data confidential. 262
Even the most diligent and highly educated consumer could not possibly read
the multiple privacy policies connected to their daily online usage. 263 One
study showed that it would take a person twenty-five days to read all the
privacy policies that pop up in a year, with a national opportunity cost of $781

259. See Chris Jay Hoofnagle & Jennifer M. Urban, Alan Westin’s Privacy Homo
Economicus, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 261 (2014); Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Privacy Harms and
the Effectiveness of the Notice and Choice Framework, 11 I/S 485, 486–87 (2015); Solove &
Hartzog, supra note 232, at 592.
260. See Robert H. Sloan & Richard Warner, Beyond Notice and Choice: Privacy, Norms,
and Consent, 14 J. HIGH TECH. L. 370, 374 (2014).
261. See Mark A. Graber, Donna M. D’Alessandro & Jill Johnson-West, Reading Level of
Privacy Policies on Internet Health Web Sites, 51 J. FAM. PRAC. 642, 642 (2002); Reidenberg et
al., supra note 259, at 491; Sloan & Warner, supra note 260, at 391; Robert Sprague & Corey
Ciocchetti, Preserving Identities: Protecting Personal Identifying Information Through
Enhanced Privacy Policies and Laws, 19 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 91, 122–23 (2009); Jan
Whittington & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Unpacking Privacy’s Price, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1327, 1357–58
(2012).
262. Notice and consent are no barrier to discrimination; “[i]nstead, giving individuals notice
and choice may simply perpetuate the growing gap between consumer ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’
because the least sophisticated consumers remain least likely to protect themselves.” Amy J.
Schmitz, Secret Consumer Scores and Segmentations: Separating “Haves” from “Have Nots,”
2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1411, 1462–63 (2014); see also Thomas H. Koenig & Michael L. Rustad,
Digital Scarlet Letters: Social Media Stigmatization of the Poor and What Can Be Done, 93 NEB.
L. REV. 592, 616, 620, 627 (2015) (explaining that low-income persons can have lower levels of
reading comprehension, rendering privacy notices useless).
263. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 259, at 492.
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billion.264 And even if consumers read and understood those polices, data
collectors could still reserve the right to change their policies in the future
without a new round of notice and consent. 265 Moreover, notice and consent
policies do not give consumers control over how third parties use their data
after buying it,266 or how inferences about them are generated from data
scraped by their social network “friends.” 267
Furthermore, data privacy policies are meaningless if they are breached.
Notice and consent do nothing to forestall or remedy broken privacy
promises, such as failure to adhere to the terms of a notice, negligent security
practices, or wrongful retention of personal data. 268 Companies have tried to
convince legislators and the public that they can effectively self-regulate, but
the resulting internal processes often lack transparency, are drafted without
input from consumers, are underfunded and short-term, and remain
unenforced.269 In addition, many companies refuse to implement even the
most basic privacy protections.270 For all these reasons, self-regulation can
operate as a cover for companies to look as though they are attuned to
consumers but is no substitute for substantive regulation. 271
264. Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 4
I/S 543, 565 (2008).
265. See Danah Boyd & Eszter Hargittai, Facebook Privacy Settings: Who Cares?, 15 FIRST
MONDAY 1, 2 (2010), https://firstmonday.org/article/view/3086/2589 [https://perma.cc/P37ZKQGF]; Paul Ohm, Branding Privacy, 97 MINN. L. REV. 907, 909 (2013) (describing how such
privacy lurches, or changes in promised policies, “disrupt long-settled expectations”); Sprague &
Ciocchetti, supra note 261, at 126.
266. See Clark D. Asay, Consumer Information Privacy and the Problem(s) of Third-Party
Disclosures, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 321, 324 (2013); Natalie Kim, Three’s a Crowd:
Towards Contextual Integrity in Third-Party Data Sharing, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 325, 327
(2014) (“[P]rivacy policies essentially remain a blunt instrument, giving users a binary option
between sharing with none or sharing with all . . . .”); Reidenberg et al., supra note 259, at 492;
Schmitz, supra note 262, at 1425.
267. Madden et al., supra note 19, at 87.
268. Reidenberg et al., supra note 259, at 521–23.
269. Robert Gellman & Pam Dixon, Many Failures: A Brief History of Privacy SelfRegulation
in
the
United
States,
WORLD
PRIVACY
F.
6
(2011),
http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/WPFselfregulationhistory.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8HK6-LJAJ]; see also Siona Listokin, Industry Self-Regulation of Consumer
Data Privacy and Security, 32 J. MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH. & PRIVACY 15, 26 (2015) (concluding
that membership in a self-regulatory body has no impact on privacy performance).
270. See Natasha Singer, Consumer Groups Back Out of Federal Talks on Face Recognition,
N.Y.
TIMES
BITS
BLOG
(June
16,
2015,
12:10
AM),
https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/06/16/consumer-groups-back-out-of-federal-talks-on-facerecognition/ [https://perma.cc/8CVE-UG99].
271. See Chris Hoofnagle, Can Privacy Self-Regulation Work for Consumers?, TAP BLOG
(Jan.
26,
2011),
https://www.techpolicy.com/Blog/January-2011/CanPrivacySelfRegulationWork-for-Consumers.aspx [https://perma.cc/QQ5U-Q6YP].
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D. Enforcement
For now, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is the United States’
primary privacy enforcer,272 with the job of holding companies to the
promises they make in the notice-and-consent regime. The FTC enforces § 5
of the FTC Act, which declares unlawful “unfair or deceptive acts or
practices,” and which the FTC uses to fill the gaps left by the existing
patchwork statutory approach to privacy.273 Using this authority, the FTC has
created a “common law” of privacy protections, in which it has taken
enforcement actions against companies that violated their posted privacy
policies, altered policies without consumer consent, made false
representations to induce consumer consent, or failed to secure consumers’
data.274 Some FTC investigations have resulted in consent orders in which
companies agree to implement measures to prevent future violations; these
orders constitute a guide to best practices regarding permissible data uses that
other companies rely upon.275 However, this is a reactive, rather than
proactive stance,276 and it is further hobbled by limited firepower, with only
forty full-time employees working on privacy issues.277 Moreover, with
regard to enforcement, the FTC cannot fine companies unless they violate an
existing consent order, and fines have been “small in relation to the gravity
of the violations.”278
Effective enforcement also hinges on identifying privacy deprivations, yet
much of the surveillance industry operates without consumers’ knowledge.
And, the industry wants to maintain that opacity. Algorithmic decisionmaking has been called a “black box” because of the complexity and lack of
transparency around machine learning.279 Attempts to breach the wall have
been met with companies claiming non-disclosure agreements and trade
secret protection for their software. 280 A criminal defendant in Wisconsin
272. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 10, at 383.
273. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 232, at 599, 621.
274. Id. at 628–40.
275. Id. at 607.
276. Barrett, supra note 28, at 1074.
277. Fred Cate, 74 Screens of Legalese Don’t Protect Your Data—Here’s a Blueprint for
New Laws that Could Make a Difference, CONVERSATION (Apr. 10, 2019),
https://theconversation.com/74-screens-of-legalese-dont-protect-your-data-heres-a-blueprintfor-new-laws-that-could-make-a-difference-115101 [https://perma.cc/FD6N-GGTL].
278. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 232, at 605; see also Barrett, supra note 28, at 1076
(noting that the largest privacy fine imposed by the FTC was $22.5 million against Google, which
is minor compared to the annual revenue of Big Tech companies).
279. See FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT
CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 4–8 (2015).
280. See Natalie Ram, Innovating Criminal Justice, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 659, 665–66 (2018).
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named Eric Loomis attempted to gain access to the COMPAS system to
understand, and challenge, his sentencing recommendation.281 The Wisconsin
Supreme Court upheld the denial of the defendant’s request, holding that the
risk assessment’s underlying code could remain secret, partly because the
algorithmic recommendation was a helpful factor, but not determinative, in
the judge’s decision-making.282
As the Loomis case demonstrates, in claims against the government for
algorithmic transparency, individuals struggle to effectuate their due process
rights to notice and a hearing.283 The barriers are multiple: people are often
unaware that a particular governmental or corporate decision was algorithmgenerated; they may struggle to access information about the algorithm due
to trade secret protections or government withholding of information; and if
they are able to obtain information about an algorithm, they may be incapable
of understanding its complexities.284
E. Anti-Discrimination Law
Current anti-discrimination law is similarly constrained in its potential to
combat algorithmic inequality. Where discrimination is intentional, as in the
Facebook advertising case, federal civil rights statutes can provide an
effective remedy.285 Of course, this requires that victims know they are the
subject of discrimination—yet most people never know why they do not get
a job interview or rental unit for which they applied. In addition to being
invisible, much modern discrimination is unintentional and based instead on
subconscious biases as well as historic patterns of structural inequality. 286
Thus, many discrimination cases hinge upon disparate impact theory, which
makes neutral policies or practices unlawful if they have differential impacts
on protected groups.287
281. Wisconsin v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2209
(2017).
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Outside the criminal context, some courts have rejected trade secret claims in favor of
plaintiffs’ due process rights. See Valentine, supra note 16, at 418 (urging advocates to
aggressively challenge trade secret claims).
285. See infra text accompanying notes 286–92; see also Rieke & Yu, supra note 29.
286. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 138, at 691, 698. See generally Linda Hamilton Krieger
& Susan T. Fiske, Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94
CALIF. L. REV. 997 (2006); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A
Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001).
287. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 138, at 701. Disparate impact theory is available in cases
brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (governing employment law), the Fair
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Solon Barocas and Andrew Selbst have explained why disparate impact
theory is ill-fit for combatting digital discrimination in employment under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.288 Algorithmic models analyze
massive amounts of data that can be highly predictive of job performance;
thus, courts permit employers to use them to match potential employees with
job-related hiring criteria.289 At the same time, due to the opacity of
algorithms, plaintiffs struggle to identify alternative employment practices
that achieve the same goals of accuracy while being less discriminatory, as
Title VII requires.290 Similar barriers to disparate impact cases arise in other
contexts—a situation recently made worse when the Department of Housing
and Urban Development announced proposed regulatory changes that, if
adopted, will undermine disparate impact theory in housing cases by allowing
landlords to rely, without liability, on algorithms created by third parties. 291
Moreover, it remains the case that poverty is not a protected class under
any anti-discrimination laws, making it perfectly acceptable to discriminate
on the basis of social class.292 Poverty also limits people from accessing legal
recourse for digital discrimination, in part due to a shortage of civil legal aid
lawyers and overwhelmed public defenders in criminal cases. 293 In addition,
companies are evading discrimination litigation by requiring employees and
consumers to sign arbitration agreements that keep disputes out of court and
Housing Act, the Age Discrimination and Employment Act, and the Americans with Disabilities
Act. See Bryan Casey, Title 2.0: Discrimination Law in a Data-Driven Society, 2019 J.L. &
MOBILITY 36, 44 (2019), https://futurist.law.umich.edu/title-2-0-discrimination-law-in-a-datadriven-society/ [https://perma.cc/DCD9-2NCX] (noting that the law is unresolved as to whether
disparate impact theory is available in Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which bans
discrimination in public accommodations).
288. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 138, at 701–12. Disparate impact claims are difficult to
win in the analogue world as well, for reasons ranging from the difficulties of assembling the
necessary statistical proof to judicial biases against employment plaintiffs. See Madden, et al,
supra note 19, at 91.
289. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 138, at 707–08.
290. Id. at 710–11.
291. HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed.
Reg. 42,854 (proposed Aug. 29, 2019).
292. Peterman, supra note 74, at 1301.
293. See LEGAL SERVICES CORP., THE JUSTICE GAP: MEASURING THE UNMET CIVIL LEGAL
NEEDS
OF
LOW-INCOME
AMERICANS
6
(2017),
https://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/images/TheJusticeGap-FullReport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X7DF-Z9EV] (“86% of the civil legal problems reported by low-income
Americans in the past year received inadequate or no legal help.”); NORMAN LEFSTEIN, SECURING
REASONABLE CASELOADS: ETHICS AND LAW IN PUBLIC DEFENSE 8 (2012),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/books/ls_sclaid_def_securing_reaso
nable_caseloads_supplement.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2M7-B5DY] (discussing the excessive
caseloads for public defenders and lack of sufficient funding).
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shrouded in secrecy, while also forbidding employees from joining
collectively to challenge discrimination.294
Finally, discrimination law covers only a subset of the technological harms
impacting low-income people. The ability to obtain a low-skill job with a
living wage, predictable hours, health care benefits, and affordable childcare
is not solely a matter of purging discriminatory employers from the
workplace. There is an entire sector of our economy that exploits workers
regardless of their race, ethnicity, or gender. Likewise, there is not enough
affordable housing in the United States, and thus getting rid of discriminatory
lenders and landlords can reduce segregation, but it will not solve the
structural problem of supply and demand. Public benefit systems serve only
poor people, so a welfare movement that asks to be treated the same as the
rich is meaningless to the social service bureaucracy. In other words, digital
deprivations prey upon structural divisions within our economy. Illegal
discrimination magnifies these disparities, but equality doctrine alone cannot
lead to equity. Non-discrimination law serves the goal of equality, which is
about treating people the same. By contrast, equity is about giving people
what they need to be successful. Because discrimination law is not about
fulfilling substantive guarantees to life’s necessities, it can never do the heavy
lifting of eliminating digital exploitation.
F. Workplace Protections
On the employment front, legal protections are equally scant. There are no
federal laws securing employee privacy in the workplace. 295 State law
protections, where they exist, are narrow. A few states protect employees
from turning over their social media passwords to their bosses, and some
require employee consent to electronic tracking, but these laws are narrow
and scattered.296
Tort law does not prohibit most employer surveillance (or any form of
surveillance).297 There is a tort that protects against “intrusion upon
seclusion,” defined as an intrusion that would be “highly offensive to a

294. See Cynthia Estlund, The Black Hole of Mandatory Arbitration, 96 N.C. L. REV. 679,
680 (2018); Christopher R. Leslie, The Arbitration Bootstrap, 94 TEX. L. REV. 265, 270, 275
(2015).
295. Ajunwa et al., supra note 196, at 747; Kim, supra note 203, at 406.
296. Ajunwa et al., supra note 196, at 757, 758–59.
297. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 10, at 385 (“Courts have largely been disinclined to
stretch the tort of privacy to online surveillance and other Internet-related intrusions.”).
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reasonable person.”298 This is a high bar, and thus this tort prohibits only the
most extreme and highly sensitive invasions of personal privacy in the
workplace, such as cameras in locker rooms or bathrooms, and it provides no
protection against the bulk of employer monitoring.299 The common law
privacy torts were created to protect elite members of society from public
scrutiny, and thus not surprisingly, they hold no promise for low-wage
workers or public benefit recipients. 300
In sum, neither current American privacy laws nor anti-discrimination
statutes currently have the teeth to secure data privacy or prevent digital
discrimination. “In this legal universe, the rhetoric of bilateral self-interest
holds sway.”301 Not surprisingly, there is an emerging consensus that America
needs comprehensive privacy legislation.302 There is less attention to the
unique privacy needs and perspectives of low-income communities. The
GDPR provides a starting point and model for considering data privacy
protections.
IV.

FIVE GDPR PRINCIPLES TO ADVANCE ECONOMIC JUSTICE

The GDPR went into effect in the EU on May 18, 2018. 303 The GDPR
provides a unified privacy law framework for EU member-countries. 304 In
contrast to U.S. privacy laws, the GDPR places multiple obligations on the
entities that gather, hold, and use personal data (called “data controllers), 305
298. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (AM. LAW INST. 1977). The other three
common-law privacy torts are public disclosure of embarrassing private facts; publicity that
places a person in a false light in the public eye; and commercial appropriation of a person’s name
or likeness. Gilman, supra note 197, at 1424. These have little application in the workplace and
were initially developed to protect elite interests. Id. at 1425–26.
299. Gilman, supra note 197, at 1425–27; Kim, supra note 203, at 411–13.
300. Gilman, supra note 197, at 1426.
301. Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 215, at 132.
302. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., INTERNET PRIVACY 31–33 (2019),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/696437.pdf [https://perma.cc/AH6Z-EJ4P]. See generally, e.g.,
Peter M. Lefkowitz, Opinion, Why America Needs a Thoughtful Federal Privacy Law, N.Y.
TIMES (June 25, 2019) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/25/opinion/congress-privacy-law.html
[https://perma.cc/8NQG-4U5V]; Nuala O’Connor, Reforming the U.S. Approach to Data
Protection
and
Privacy,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL.
(Jan.
30,
2018),
https://www.cfr.org/report/reforming-us-approach-data-protection
[https://perma.cc/44SXEMLB].
303. GDPR, supra note 1.
304. See id. at arts. 1–3. The GDPR permits derogations (or variations) on a country-bycountry level on certain issues. See id. at arts. 85(2), 89(3).
305. GDPR, supra note 1, at art. 4(7). Personal data is defined as “any information relating
to an identified or identifiable natural person.” Id. at art. 4(1).
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while also granting consumers (called “data subjects”) rights to enhance their
control over personal information.306 The GDPR is based on the longstanding EU conception of privacy as a fundamental human right that
constrains both government and private entities.307 Whereas in the United
States, data collection is freely allowed unless a specific law prohibits it; in
the EU, a data controller can only collect data with a legally granted basis. 308
Under the GDPR, data subjects possess these core rights 309:


to be informed when data is being collected, including how
and why it will be processed, along with a notice of
rights,310



to provide informed consent before personal data is
processed,311



to object or withdraw consent to processing of personal
data, including the right to opt out of direct marketing,312



to access personal data in an understandable format and in
a timely manner,313



to request correction of inaccurate or incomplete data,314



to have personal data erased (the right to be forgotten),315



to have personal data transferred from one service provider
to another (the right to portability),316



to obtain human intervention in significant decisions based
on automated processing,317 and

306. Id. at art. 4(1); see also Barrett, supra note 28, at 1083 (describing the GDPR’s rightsbased framework).
307. Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 215, at 123–26 (discussing history of privacy rights in
the EU).
308. Barrett, supra note 28, at 1083; Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 215, at 120, 123; cf.
Rustad & Koenig, supra note 10, at 368 (discussing the convergences between EU and U.S.
approaches).
309. These rights are not absolute; rather, there are various exceptions and conditions, and
application of the GDPR may require a balancing of interests when rights conflict. GDPR, supra
note 1, at recital (4).
310. Id. at arts. 12–14.
311. Id. at arts. 6(1), 7.
312. Id. at arts. 7(3), 21.
313. Id. at art. 15(1).
314. Id. at art. 16.
315. Id. at art. 17.
316. Id. at art. 20.
317. Id. at art. 22.
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With this combination of controller responsibilities and data subject rights,
the GDPR seeks to vindicate principles of lawfulness, fairness, and
transparency; purpose limitation; data minimization; accuracy; storage
limitation; integrity and confidentiality; and accountability.319
The GDPR permits country-specific derogations on certain issues and
contains unresolved textual ambiguities. Thus, many terms of the GDPR will
gain further definition and content as the law is implemented and enforced
over the coming years. Interpretive sources include the Recitals in the
Preamble, guidance issued by the Article 29 Working Party (A29WP) (an
advisory board of data protection authorities from across the EU), and the
interpretations of member-country enforcement agencies. 320 Despite its
ambiguities, the GDPR contains several provisions that have the potential—
if enforced—to limit the big data harms to low-income and marginalized
communities and, by enhancing transparency and accountability, to spur
more targeted, substantive protections in the future. These five principles
have the potential to advance economic justice: (1) the right to an
explanation, (2) the right not to be subject to decisions based on automated
profiling, (3) the right to be forgotten, (4) a requirement of public
participation, and (5) robust implementation and enforcement. 321 Only time
will tell if these provisions fulfill their potential to enhance the data privacy
of vulnerable groups, but they provide an existing template for thinking about
how to shape comprehensive privacy laws in the United States, at both the
federal and state levels. Each one is discussed in turn.
A. Right to an Explanation
The “black box” of algorithmic decision-making hinders transparency,
legibility, and accountability. The GDPR contains several provisions
designed to open the box, including what has been popularly termed the

318. Id. at art. 15(1)(h).
319. Id. at art. 5.
320. See Bryan Casey, Ashkon Farhangi & Roland Vogl, Rethinking Explainable Machines:
The GDPR’s “Right to Explanation” Debate and the Rise of Algorithmic Audits in Enterprise, 34
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 145, 152–53 (2019); Talia B. Gillis & Josh Simons, Explanation <
Justification: GDPR and the Perils of Privacy, 2 PA. J.L. & INNOVATION 71, 71 (2019); Margot
E. Kaminski, The Right to Explanation, Explained, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 189, 193–95 (2019).
321. See GDPR, supra note 1, at arts. 13–15, 17, 22, 35, 77–84.
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“right to an explanation.”322 Under the GDPR, entities that handle the
personal data of EU citizens must “ensure fair and transparent processing” in
automated decision-making by providing citizens with “meaningful
information about the logic involved.”323 The scope of the GDPR’s right to
an explanation is hotly contested within the scholarly and technical
communities.324 One core question is whether the explanation should be about
how the automated decision-making system was applied to a specific person,
or whether it should describe how the system operates as a whole. Solon
Barocas and Andrew Selbst frame this as a choice between “outcome-based”
or “logic-based” explanations.325 Outcome-based explanations focus on the
facts that proved relevant to a particular machine-generated decision. 326 These
explanations can potentially provide people with information necessary to
correct errors or omissions, or to make a fix to their data to obtain goods or
services (such as by changing their spending patterns to improve their credit
rating). However, individualized explanations generally are not sufficient to
uncover disparate impacts on certain groups or to solve structural problems
that can be baked into algorithms.327
Accordingly, logic-based explanations might be necessary to ferret out
digital discrimination. Such an explanation could reveal coding biases,
improper interpretations of regulatory or business objectives, adverse impacts
on particular groups, and other embedded problems in particular models. 328
The challenge with logic-based explanations is that they are often complex,
if not inscrutable, to the layperson. 329 Even computer scientists and engineers
can struggle to understand the machine learning mechanisms that they set in
motion, because machine learning can be opaque, with “constellations of
data . . . so complex that it’s tough to retrace the line drawn by the
322. Id. at art. 71.
323. Id. at arts. 13(2), 14(2), 15(1). This right is set forth in Articles 13, 14, and 15, which
require transparency in connection with automated decision-making, id. at arts. 13–15, as well as
Article 22, which specifically concerns “automated individual decision-making, including
profiling,” id. at art. 22.
324. For summaries of the debate, see Casey et al., supra note 320, at 159–65; Andrew D.
Selbst & Julia Powles, Meaningful Information and the Right to Explanation, 7 INT’L DATA
PRIVACY L. 233, 233–34, 237–39 (2017) (summarizing debate).
325. Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of Explainable Machines, 87
FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1099 (2018); cf. Edwards & Veale, supra note 137, at 55 (tracking the
difference between model-centric versus subject-centric explanations).
326. Selbst & Barocas, supra note 325, at 1100.
327. Id. at 1105 (explaining that a single consumer cannot observe disparate impact, and an
outcome-based explanation does not reveal why a system was constructed a certain way, which
is necessary to prove disparate impact).
328. See id. at 1108–09.
329. Id. at 1093–94.
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machine.”330 Providing laypeople with confusing explanations may
technically comply with a regulatory command, but “[r]ights become
dangerous things if they are unreasonably hard to exercise or ineffective in
results, because they give the illusion that something has been done while in
fact things are no better.”331 Moreover, people generally do not want a tutorial
in machine learning methodology; rather, they want a decision in their favor,
or at least guidance on how to secure one. 332
Accordingly, Andrew Selbst and Julia Powles argue that any explanation
must serve the instrumental value of being “at least meaningful enough to
facilitate the data subject’s exercise of her rights guaranteed by the GDPR
and human rights law.”333 Similarly, Margot Kaminski calls for an
explanation that “provide[s] enough information that an individual can act on
it.”334 In other words, “the substance of the other underlying legal rights often
determines” the nature of the right to an explanation.”335 The A29WP has
issued guidance that reflects these insights, providing that “a complex
mathematical explanation” is not necessary and instead defining “meaningful
information about the logic involved” to include (1) the categories of data
used in processing; (2) the relevance of the data; (3) how profiles are built;
(4) the relevance of the profile to the decision-making process; and (5) how
the profile is used for an individualized decision.336
The concept of an explanation for algorithmic decision-making is not
foreign to American law. The United States has consumer statutes that give
consumers the right to an outcome-based explanation with regard to
unfavorable consumer reports that impact their access to credit, employment,

330. Dave Gershgorn, We Don’t Understand How AI Make Most Decisions, so Now
Algorithms Are Explaining Themselves, QUARTZ (Dec. 20, 2016), https://qz.com/865357/wedont-understand-how-ai-make-most-decisions-so-now-algorithms-are-explaining-themselves/
[https://perma.cc/4JC3-AYXA]; see also Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U.
PA. L. REV. 633, 638 (2017); Mike Ananny & Kate Crawford, Seeing Without Knowing:
Limitations of the Transparency Ideal and Its Application to Algorithmic Accountability, NEW
MEDIA & SOC’Y (2016), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1461444816676645
[https://perma.cc/UP7L-GPQD].
331. Lilian Edwards & Michael Veale, Enslaving the Algorithm: From a “Right to an
Explanation” to a “Right to Better Decisions”?, 16 IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY 46, 50 (2018).
332. Edwards & Veale, supra note 137, at 42.
333. Selbst & Powles, supra note 324, at 236.
334. Kaminski, supra note 320, at 213.
335. Id.; see also Edwards & Veale, supra note 137, at 55–58.
336. Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party Guidelines on Automated Individual DecisionMaking and Profiling for the Purposes of Regulation 2016/679, at 31, WP 251, (Feb. 6, 2018),
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/document.cfm?doc_id=49826 [https://perma.cc/M92KBGZ6] [hereinafter A29WP].
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insurance, or housing.337 The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FRCRA) and the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) together seek to ensure that credit
reports are fair, accurate, and non-discriminatory. 338 These laws require that
individuals whose consumer reports are used adversely in lending,
employment, insurance, or housing be issued an “adverse action notice.” 339
In the credit context, the notices typically advise consumers which factors,
from a pre-set checklist of twenty-four reasons, resulted in their adverse
action; listed factors include “credit application incomplete;” “unable to
verify credit references;” and “temporary or irregular employment” and the
like.340
The FCRA/ECOA “explanation” is thus outcome-based. With the adverse
action notice in hand, consumers supposedly have the opportunity to better
understand decisions that impact them, to take steps to reverse the action, and
to prevent discrimination.341 Still, the FCRA explanation does not tell a
person how or why the listed factor adversely impacted their score. 342 And it
cannot effectively uncover disparate impact. 343 By contrast, the GDPR’s
requirement that controllers provide data subjects with information of the
“logic involved” in a decision appears to envisage a broader, more detailed
explanation about how the automated decision-making model operates. 344 In
short, the GDPR is aimed at a “meaningful” explanation, and not a FCRAstyle checklist, which can be illusory. At this time, it remains to be seen how
EU enforcement authorities will interpret the “right to an explanation.”
On this side of the Atlantic, policymakers should recognize that both
outcome-based and logic-based explanations are warranted, depending on the
circumstances, to advance data privacy that fosters non-discrimination and
economic justice. We know that algorithms are impacting access to
employment, education, housing, health care, financial services, insurance,
consumer goods, electoral information, and public benefits in the United

337. See Selbst & Barocas, supra note 325, at 1099–1100.
338. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (2018) (FCRA); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691–1691f (2018) (ECOA);
see also Selbst & Barocas, supra note 325, at 1102. On the purposes underlying the statutes, see
Shepard, supra note 87, at 1746 (“Congress’s primary objective was to give consumers a
meaningful participatory role in an otherwise ex parte ‘trial’ that had the potential to deprive a
consumer of credit, insurance, and employment.”).
339. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681m, 1691(d)(2) (2018).
340. 12 C.F.R. pt. 1002 app. C (2018) (the sample notification form issued by the Federal
Reserve Bank to satisfy the adverse action notification requirements).
341. Selbst & Barocas, supra note 325, at 1102.
342. See Hertza, supra note 87, at 1727.
343. Selbst & Barocas, supra note 325, at 1104–05.
344. Id. at 1107.
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States.345 We know far less about how algorithms are designed, the data that
feeds them, the desired outcomes, or whether the models are accurate in
meeting those outcomes. A statutory right to an explanation would provide
much needed transparency around these issues. Transparency is foundational
to accountability, which in turn “empowers those who might otherwise be
powerless, demanding that those who wield power over them offer an account
of their conduct.”346
In some circumstances, an outcome-based explanation may be adequate to
ensure that a system is operating fairly and in compliance with the law. For
instance, a legal services lawyer could use a right to an explanation to benefit
clients, without having to undertake onerous litigation. In the current “black
box” environment, it is difficult to know why a client was denied a job or
housing or public benefits or the like, or even if an algorithm was involved.
Further, much litigation involving low-income people has no discovery or
very limited discovery tools.347 And even where discovery is available, it is a
poor substitute for a right to an explanation, because it occurs only after cases
are filed—and cases cannot be filed without a good faith basis to believe that
wrongful conduct has occurred.348 Thus, a right to an outcome-based
explanation would open the algorithmic black box to scrutiny, allowing
consumers to correct errors or omissions in their personal data; to request
reconsideration; to explain why the algorithm is inaccurate or inappropriate
given their personal situation; or to take steps to improve one’s chance at
meeting the algorithm’s desired outcomes. On the technical side, computer
scientists are devising explanatory systems that “translate” code into
cognizable visualizations and interactions for laypersons, and research in this
area is constantly evolving.349 These tools can help low-income people and
their advocates identify actionable claims, particularly since lawyers who
represent low-income people typically lack resources for costly experts to
help them understand and litigate scientific and technical material.
In other circumstances, it may be necessary to challenge an underlying
model, such as when the algorithm inaccurately interprets the law or
discriminates against protected groups. Consider Facebook’s advertising
345. See supra Part II.
346. Gillis & Simons, supra note 320, at 76.
347. See BRITTANY K.T. KAUFFMAN, ALLOCATING THE COSTS OF DISCOVERY: LESSONS
LEARNED
AT
HOME
AND
ABROAD
2–3
(2014),
https://iaals.du.edu/sites/default/files/documents/publications/allocating_the_costs_of_discovery
.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7LR-N3ZD].
348. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
349. Edwards & Veale, supra note 137, at 62–63; Kaminski, supra note 320, at 214; Selbst
& Barocas, supra note 325, at 1114–17.
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system, which was employing algorithms to allow advertisers to exclude
women, older workers, minorities, and other defined groups from seeing
certain ads in their feeds.350 In such a situation, an individualized outcomebased explanation would not be adequate to dissemble the entire system. 351 In
addition, there may be situations in which people question whether or not
automated decision-making is appropriate for the setting at hand.
Understanding how a model operates may help answer whether automated
decision-making is a valid exercise of commercial or governmental power.
Thus, American law should require explanations not only for dissatisfied
or curious individuals but also to regulatory experts and independent third
parties with the technical chops to audit systems for accuracy, as well as “for
noncompliance with values like equality, nondiscrimination, dignity, privacy,
and human rights.”352 Audits are “the most prevalent social scientific method
for the detection of discrimination” in machine learning systems.353 The law
can also require that algorithmic systems build in technical accountability,
meaning software “that furnishes relevant evidence to support evaluation
and . . . . assures that the subject of any such processes can determine that the
rules and procedures have been followed.”354 Significantly, the GDPR’s right
to an explanation both contains “individual transparency rights” and a
“systemic approach to algorithmic accountability.”355 The GDPR’s systemic
approach is accomplished in part through outside algorithmic audits by

350. See supra text accompanying notes 67–75.
351. Selbst & Barocas, supra note 325, at 1105 (arguing that a consumer’s “single point of
reference does not provide any understanding of the frequency of denials along protected-class
lines, so she cannot observe disparate impact”).
352. Waldman, supra note 24, at 630 (advocating for substantive audits in lieu of processoriented proposals). “In addition, a system could be built to enable participants to check these
properties for their own outcomes so that nontechnical users could verify these facts while the
system as a whole would be overseen by others—potentially both inside and outside of
government—who have the necessary technological expertise.” Kroll et al., supra note 330, at
703.
353. Christian Sandvig et al., Auditing Algorithms: Research Methods for Detecting
Discrimination on Internet Platforms 5 (May 22, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://wwwpersonal.umich.edu/~csandvig/research/Auditing%20Algorithms%20--%20Sandvig%20-%20ICA%202014%20Data%20and%20Discrimination%20Preconference.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QK2N-4HFU].
354. Deven R. Desai & Joshua A. Kroll, Trust but Verify: A Guide to Algorithms and the
Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 44 (2018).
355. Kaminski, supra note 320, at 211; see also Edwards and Veale, supra note 137, at 77–
80 (noting that the DPIA process can fulfill due process norms more effectively than
individualized explanations).
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government authorities and independent third parties, as well as through
internal Data Protection Impact Assessments. 356
In the GDPR, the right to an explanation is designed to improve the
fairness, transparency, and accountability of algorithmic decision-making,
and likewise in the United States, a right to an explanation should be shaped
broadly and contextually to effectuate that objective. Explanations can help
uncover digital discrimination and exploitation against the poor, improve the
accuracy of automated decision-making systems that sort the poor and serve
as gatekeepers to life necessities, and expose surveillance systems to public
scrutiny. In all these ways, the right to an explanation can enhance economic
justice.
B. Right to Object to Automated Profiling
Article 22 of the GDPR gives individuals the “right not to be subject to a
decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling” when the
decision produces “legal effects” or “similarly significant[ ] [e]ffects” on the
individual.357 In short, it ensures humans have recourse to human decisionmakers on important decisions that impact their lives. Automated processing
has serious consequences for low-income populations, who are more likely
to be subject to algorithmic decisions and for whom the stakes are high. As
Cathy O’Neil explains, “The privileged . . . are processed more by people,
the masses by machines.”358 For example, “A white-shoe law firm or an
exclusive prep school will lean far more on recommendations and face-toface interviews than will a fast-food chain or a cash-strapped urban school
district.”359
The GDPR defines automated processing broadly with a nod toward the
consequences of socioeconomic profiling. Its definition covers the processing
of factors that can be used to segment people by social class and other
categories. It applies to data used “to analyse or predict aspects concerning
[a] natural person’s performance at work, economic situation, health,
personal preferences, interests, reliability, behaviour, location or

356. Kaminski, supra note 320, at 205–06.
357. GDPR, supra note 1, at art. 22(1). Article 22 contains three exceptions: (a) for
processing necessary for performing a contract, (b) where the law permits it and there are
safeguards for the data subject’s rights, and (c) where the data subject has given explicit consent.
Id. at art. 22(2).
358. O’NEIL, supra note 14, at 8.
359. Id.
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movements.”360 Even when people consent to automated processing, which
is a permissible basis for processing under the GDPR, a data controller must
still provide “suitable measures to safeguard the data subject’s rights,”
including “at least the right to obtain human intervention . . . to express [the
data subject’s] point of view and to contest the decision.” 361 Moreover, some
sensitive data are off the table for profiling altogether in the absence of
explicit consent or other narrow, protective exceptions 362: racial or ethnic
origin, political opinions, religious beliefs, trade union membership, health
data, sex life, sexual orientation, and genetic data. 363 The GDPR thus provides
a backstop against algorithmic inferences and predictions about people that
might not be accurate, fair, or appropriate.
There are three key questions about the scope of Article 22 that remain to
be resolved as the GDPR is implemented: (1) how much human intervention
takes a decision outside the scope of Article 22’s protections? (2) what
constitutes a decision with “legal” or “similarly significant” effect? and
(3) does Article 22 ban these forms of automated processing altogether or
instead provide data subjects with a right to opt out of such processing? 364
Each of these questions can be answered narrowly or broadly. Adopting the
most privacy protective resolution to each of these open questions would
enhance the economic mobility of low-income people.
To begin with, the GDPR recognizes the importance of keeping a human
in the loop when automated decision-making is used. In many contexts,
algorithmic outputs are not determinative on their own but are used to inform
human judgments. Consider the COMPAS criminal sentencing algorithm in
which a judge considers the algorithm’s recommendation in assessing a
defendant’s likelihood of re-offense. 365 Here, the algorithm is supposed to
inform the judge’s decision-making and not to supplant it. This would not
violate the GDPR’s ban on solely automated decision-making. To be sure,
there are concerns that judges are too deferential to algorithms because they

360. GDPR, supra note 1, at art. 4(4) (emphasis added).
361. Id. at arts. 7, 22(3).
362. Other exceptions are if the processing is necessary to perform a contract or is legally
authorized, and there are “suitable measures to safeguard the data subject’s rights and freedoms
and legitimate interests.” Id. at art. 22(2).
363. Id. at arts. 9(1), 22(4).
364. See generally Michael Veale & Lilian Edwards, Clarity, Surprises, and Further
Questions in the Article 29 Working Party Draft Guidance on Automated Decision-Making and
Profiling, 34 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 398 (2018).
365. See supra text accompanying notes 118–122.
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see them as objective and infallible; this is the dilemma of automation bias. 366
Still, the judicial system keeps a “human in the loop” and provides
mechanisms for advocacy and an adversarial process to contest the
algorithmically-informed outcome. This judicial process would thus satisfy
the GDPR’s ban on solely automated processing, although risk prediction
algorithms may well run afoul of constitutional due process and equal
protection norms and be litigated on those grounds.367 In other words, the
transparency provided by a strong privacy law can be a foundation to seek
accountability via other legal doctrines.
Consider, by contrast, an algorithm that sorts job applicants by predicting
who is most likely to stay with the company long-term. A human resources
employee who prints out a batch of applications meeting the algorithmic
threshold and automatically sets up interviews with those candidates would
not constitute meaningful human interaction. Thus, the company’s decision
to deny an interview to a person without any opportunities for an explanation
or to challenge the decision would constitute a form of impermissible
automated profiling.368
Of course, this right cannot possibly attach to every instance of automated
decision-making; these tools touch almost every sector of the economy. 369 For
this reason, Article 22 applies only to decisions with legal or similarly
significant effects. The A29WP opines that significant decisions include
those that affect financial circumstances, access to health services, access to
education, or that deny employment.370 These are all key elements of
achieving economic stability.
By contrast, it is generally assumed that targeted advertising—even
though it relies extensively on automated profiling—falls outside the scope

366. See supra text accompanying note 127; see also Angèle Christin, Alex Rosenblat &
Danah Boyd, Courts and Predictive Algorithms, DATA & SOC’Y 8 (Oct. 27, 2015),
https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_documents/Angele%20Christin.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UXS6-XDW2] (stating that an algorithm “seems more reliable, scientific, and
legitimate than other sources of information,” despite the reality that algorithmic quality varies
immensely).
367. See generally Starr, supra note 123.
368. See Veale & Edwards, supra note 364, at 400 (“There is a strong argument therefore
that rights to control ‘solely’ automated decision making must also apply to decisions made with
some degree of human involvement . . . .”). These two examples only touch upon the wide range
of human involvement in automated decision. See generally Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Karen Levy
& Daniel Susser, Strange Loops: Apparent Versus Actual Human Involvement in Automated
Decision Making, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 745 (2019).
369. Veale & Edwards, supra note 364, at 399.
370. A29WP, supra note 336, at 22.
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of Article 22.371 People may be annoyed or find it creepy to be followed
around social media with sneaker advertisements after briefly viewing a Nike
basketball shoe online,372 but it will not likely have a significant impact on
their life.373 Nevertheless, some targeted ads are aimed at particularly
vulnerable consumers in manipulative ways that can have serious
consequences. Examples include advertising for payday loans and for-profit
educational institutions, which are targeted to minority and low-income
people but would rarely appear in the social media feed of a high-income
earner.374 Latanya Sweeney compared Google searches of female names
associated with blacks (such as Latanya and Latisha) to searches of more
typically white names (such as Kristen and Jill) and found that ads related to
an arrest record appeared more frequently for the former than the latter. 375
This disparity could have detrimental effects if an employer is conducting a
background check by searching an applicant’s name, and it can also harm a
person’s self-identity and dignity regardless of the employment
consequences.
Safiya Noble describes disturbingly sexist and racist content generated in
response to internet searches of terms relating to minority groups and
women.376 For instance, when Noble conducted a Google search in 2011 of
the term “black girls,” the top results were links to pornography. 377 Such
results compound race and gender profiling, “and even economic redlining,”
as discriminatory digital profiles control access to key resources and
opportunities.378 Noble explains that machine learning is not neutral; rather,
it includes “decision-making protocols that favor corporate elites and the
powerful.”379
In this vein, the A29WP acknowledges that dignitary impacts on certain
groups can be significant, stating that prohibited forms of solely automated
processing include those that “have the potential to significantly affect the

371. Id.
372. See IGO, supra note 2, at 352 (discussing the framing of privacy concerns related to data
collection practices).
373. Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 1029 (2014)
(arguing “the experience is not a comfortable one” and is fairly described as “Kafkaesque”).
374. O’NEIL, supra note 14, at 144.
375. Latanya Sweeney, Discrimination in Online Ad Delivery, CORNELL U. (Jan. 29, 2013),
https://arxiv.org/abs/1301.6822 [https://perma.cc/MH4Q-LVC6].
376. SAFIYA UMOJA NOBLE, ALGORITHMS OF OPPRESSION: HOW SEARCH ENGINES
REINFORCE RACISM 3–9 (2018).
377. Id. at 3.
378. Id. at 28.
379. Id. at 29.
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circumstances, behavior or choices of the individuals concerned.” 380
Significant effects thus must be judged by the intrusiveness of the profiling
process, the expectations and wishes of the individuals concerned, the manner
in which the ad is delivered, and the particular vulnerabilities of the data
subjects targeted.381 There are thus times when targeted advertisements may
be impermissible.
Limitations on automated processing would help expand opportunities for
low-income people in the United States. Despite America’s identity as a
socially mobile society, the reality is that most people’s economic standing
is determined by the parents to whom they are born. 382 Forty percent of
children born in the bottom quintile of the income scale will remain there
their entire lives; and the same is true of forty percent born in the top
quintile.383 The poverty rate is almost twelve percent, or 38.1 million
people,384 while millions more above the official poverty line struggle to meet
basic needs.385 Even in times of robust economic growth, growing economic
inequality has continued unabated.386 The top one percent earns sixteen
percent of the nation’s income and holds almost forty percent of its wealth, 387
380. A29WP, supra note 336, at 21.
381. Id. at 22.
382. See ICELAND, supra note 43, at 62; Michele Gilman, A Court for the One Percent: How
the Supreme Court Contributes to Economic Inequality, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 389, 407 (2014)
(citing data and sources).
383. PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, PURSUING THE AMERICAN DREAM: ECONOMIC MOBILITY
ACROSS
GENERATIONS
6
(2012),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2012/pursuingamericandrea
mpdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/DH6M-ERVZ].
384. JESSICA SEMEGA ET AL., INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2018, at 12
(2019),
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2019/demo/p60266.pdf [https://perma.cc/F8RZ-QWGH].
385. See ICELAND, supra note 43, at 56 (“[A] third of all people were near poor and poor.”);
Poverty Facts: The Population of Poverty USA, POVERTY USA (2019),
https://www.povertyusa.org/facts [https://perma.cc/VBK9-7XR7] (“And 29.9% of the
population—or 93.6 million—live close to poverty, with incomes less than two times that of their
poverty thresholds.”); Arloc Sherman & Paul N. Van de Water, Reducing Cost-of-Living
Adjustment Would Make Poverty Line a Less Accurate Measure of Basic Needs, CTR. ON BUDGET
& POL’Y PRIORITIES (June 11, 2019), https://www.cbpp.org/research/poverty-andinequality/reducing-cost-of-living-adjustment-would-make-poverty-line-a-less
[https://perma.cc/67TV-7JJS] (“[O]fficial estimates of minimum living costs consistently exceed
the poverty line by a wide margin”).
386. Taylor Telford, Income Inequality in America Is the Highest It’s Been Since Census
Bureau Started Tracking It, Data Shows, WASH. POST (Sept. 26, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/09/26/income-inequality-america-highest-itsbeen-since-census-started-tracking-it-data-show/ [https://perma.cc/VS6P-F7W8].
387. Chad Stone et al., A Guide to Statistics on Historical Trends in Income Inequality, CTR.
ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Jan. 13, 2020), https://www.cbpp.org/research/poverty-and-
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while wage stagnation plagues middle class and low-wage workers despite
their productivity and low rates of unemployment.388
Unrestrained automated profiling risks further entrenching these trends
because it can perpetuate inaccurate and biased inferences about people
without their knowledge or avenues for recourse, which, in turn, limits
opportunities and traps people in cycles of disadvantage. 389 Further,
employers and businesses can mine data to adopt practices that limit people’s
autonomy and chances for economic advancement.390 In all these ways,
automated profiling can lead to digital discrimination and economic
exploitation, while masking inaccuracies and incomplete data. Moreover,
without a human in the loop, surveillance determinations might punish
certain categories of people without due process. Limitations on automated
profiling could temper these outcomes. It would push entities relying upon
algorithms to provide basic due process protections to impacted individuals,
thereby fulfilling values of transparency and accountability, while improving
accuracy in decision-making.
C. Right To Be Forgotten and Criminal Records
The GDPR contains a right to be forgotten, guaranteeing data subjects the
right to demand that a data controller erase their personal data. 391 The right
derives from a 2014 case decided by the European Court of Justice, called
Google v. Spain, holding that Europeans have a right to demand that search
engines remove links to their personal data.392 In that case, a Spanish national
objected to the results of internet searches of his name that brought up
evidence of past debt.393 The court reasoned that a private person’s right to
privacy overrode Google’s economic interests, as well as the general public’s
inequality/a-guide-to-statistics-on-historical-trends-in-income-inequality
[https://perma.cc/QLT3-KUPF].
388. ELISE GOULD, STATE OF WORKING AMERICA: WAGES 2018, at 1 (2019),
https://www.epi.org/files/pdf/161043.pdf [https://perma.cc/JGA2-LNAT].
389. Stephen Buranyi, Rise of the Racist Robots—How AI Is Learning All Our Worst
Impulses, GUARDIAN (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/inequality/2017/aug/08/riseof-the-racist-robots-how-ai-is-learning-all-our-worst-impulses [https://perma.cc/38SZ-SY3A].
390. Nathan Newman, How Big Data Enables Economic Harm to Consumers, Especially to
Low-Income and Other Vulnerable Sectors of the Population, 18 J. INTERNET L. 11, 12 (2014).
391. GDPR, supra note 1, at art. 17.
392. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, 2014
E.C.R. ¶ 97.
393. He also challenged the publication of his debt in a newspaper; however, the Spanish
data protection agency rejected that claim, ruling that the newspaper lawfully published that
content. That aspect of the decision was not appealed to the European Court of Justice. Id. at ¶ 14.
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interest in finding the information, although these competing factors require
a case-by-case balancing.394 This right does not delete online content about a
data subject altogether; rather, it makes that content more difficult to find via
a search engine.395 A similar, narrowly tailored right to be forgotten in the
United States could promote economic justice.
As Dan Solove has noted, “People grow and change, and disclosures of
information from their past can inhibit their ability to reform their behavior,
to have a second chance, or to alter their life’s direction.”396 A second chance
can be particularly important for people who experience poverty, which
operates as a social stigma. Moreover, “due to modern digital technologies
and global networks, forgetting has become the exception, and remembering
the new rule.”397 As noted above, the official poverty rate is almost twelve
percent.398 However, poverty in America is not a static condition. Most poor
people remain under the poverty line only for short periods of time, although
they may cycle in and out of poverty over their lifetimes. 399 Almost half of
poverty spells end within a year, while seventy percent end within three
years.400 Only twelve percent of poverty spells last more than a decade. 401
Poverty may be short-term, but it is widespread. Almost half of Americans
will fall below the poverty line for at least one year between the ages of
twenty-five and seventy-five.402 At some point, two-thirds of all Americans
between twenty and sixty-five will turn to a social welfare program such as
food stamps or Medicaid.403 In short, there is a lot of movement in and out of
poverty, largely due to economic instability such as job losses, low wages,
caretaking obligations, divorce, and illness. 404 Moreover, poverty is more
394. Id. at ¶ 97.
395. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 10, at 406.
396. Solove, supra note 224, at 533.
397. Michal Lavi, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly Behavior, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 2597,
2628 (2019).
398. SEMEGA ET AL., supra note 384, at 1.
399. ICELAND, supra note 43, at 61.
400. See id.
401. Id.
402. Approximately forty-two percent of Americans will fall into the bottom tenth percentile
of the income distribution, while sixty percent will fall into the bottom twentieth percentile for at
least one year between the ages of twenty-five and sixty. MARK R. RANK & THOMAS A. HIRSCHL,
THE LIKELIHOOD OF EXPERIENCING RELATIVE POVERTY OVER THE LIFE COURSE 1 (2015),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4511740/pdf/pone.0133513.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YM5T-3NDL].
403. Mark R. Rank, Rethinking American Poverty, 10 CONTEXTS 16, 18 (2011).
404. ANN HUFF STEVENS, TRANSITIONS INTO AND OUT OF POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 1
(2013),
https://poverty.ucdavis.edu/sites/main/files/fileattachments/policy_brief_stevens_poverty_transitions_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/8YBH-6683].
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than a low income—it is “better understood as something akin to correlated
adversity that cuts across multiple dimensions (material, social, bodily,
psychological) and institutions (schools, neighborhoods, prisons).” 405
Algorithms impact all these dimensions, and are used by—or targeted at—all
these institutions.
Poor people in America face discrimination due to their economic status,
which is compounded by intersectional factors such as race, ethnicity, and
gender.406 Nevertheless, poverty is not a protected class in American antidiscrimination law, meaning that it is perfectly legal to discriminate against
poor people.407 In American culture, poor people are stigmatized as lazy and
dishonest and blamed for their economic status, even though poverty is rooted
in structural, rather than cultural, factors. 408 Poverty today is driven by a
multitude of interlocking factors, including the growth of low-wage jobs;
declining power of unions; lack of universal child care, health care, and
affordable housing; inadequate education; limited social supports; growing
income inequality; and discrimination—in sum, “a failure of the economic
and political structures to provide enough decent opportunities and supports
for the whole of society.”409
Danieli Evans Peterman highlights a range of discriminatory practices
based on socioeconomic status, writing,
Employers screen applicants by residential address and weed out
people who live in notoriously poor neighborhoods. Municipalities
enact zoning rules for the purpose of excluding low income
residents. Schools place wealthier students in more advanced
classes with more experienced teachers. States require voters to
show identification documents that poor people have more
difficulty obtaining.410

Technology can make each of these forms of poverty discrimination even
easier. Employers can use screening services to weed out low-income people
from the pool of job applicants. Credit scoring algorithms can lead banks to
deny loans to low-income people, thereby entrenching zoning disparities.
Public school placement algorithms can favor technologically sophisticated
and wealthy parents. Algorithms can be used to gerrymander districts in ways
that dilute votes of poor people and people of color.
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.

Desmond & Western, supra note 15, at 308.
See ICELAND, supra note 43, at 107–20.
Peterman, supra note 74, at 1286–87.
ICELAND, supra note 43, at 125–30.
Rank, supra note 403, at 19.
Peterman, supra note 74, at 1286.
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Furthermore, social media is feeding adverse stereotypes about poor
people to the gatekeepers of important social resources, such as employers
and loan companies. While wealthier people can hire reputation management
services to clean up their online profiles, poor people are left with a “tarnished
mark” that “undermines their economic and educational opportunities and
reinforces social gaps.”411 Thomas Koenig and Michael Rustad identify
various “[d]igital marks of shame,”412 such as obesity and tobacco use that
are strongly correlated with poverty but that previously might have remained
invisible to these gatekeepers and the general public.413 Today, these are traits
that employers are tracking through applicant screening services, wellness
programs, and other surveillance technologies. As a result, employers may be
tempted not to hire, or to fire, certain low-income workers to save on health
insurance costs. Further, people face inferences not only from their own
social media posts but also from data gleaned from their social media
“friends,” which feeds into their digital profiles.414 Their friends’ habits and
preferences are used to make predictions about their conduct. For all these
reasons, a right to be forgotten could help low-income people move past
negative inferences generated from their economic status.
In the United States, we punish the poor, but we also share certain cultural
norms about starting anew that are associated with “the immigrant, pioneer
histories of so many Americans” and our individualistic ethos. 415 We see
these norms reflected in various settings. For instance, in the justice system,
character evidence is generally inadmissible in trials because of a bedrock
legal principle that people should be judged by their actions and not their past
conduct or personality traits.416 We also provide people with fresh economic
starts through bankruptcy, which allows people and companies to eliminate
their debts and begin again with a clean slate.417 To bolster this financial fresh
start, credit reporting agencies cannot include data about bankruptcies after
seven to ten years (depending on the form of bankruptcy filed), 418 and
employers cannot discriminate against employees who have declared
411. Lavi, supra note 397, at 2643.
412. Koenig & Rustad, supra note 262, at 596.
413. Id. at 600. Obesity rates among the poor are high in part due to the lack of access to
fresh food in poor neighborhoods; tobacco rates are higher among the poor due to targeted
advertising. Id. at 600–01.
414. Id. at 611.
415. Jean-Francois Blanchette & Deborah G. Johnson, Data Retention and the Panoptic
Society: The Social Benefits of Forgetfulness, 18 INFO. SOC’Y 33, 35 (2002).
416. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
417. See Blanchette & Johnson, supra note 415, at 36.
418. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(1) (2018).
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bankruptcy.419 FRCA likewise requires erasure of arrests, civil lawsuits, and
legal judgments in credit reports after seven years.420 These measures are
designed to limit the stigma associated with bankruptcy and other interactions
with the justice system. The United States should follow the lead of the
GDPR and expand the right to be forgotten beyond these narrow contexts.
Some commentators contend we should forget about a right to be forgotten
in the United States because it is barred by the First Amendment. 421 However,
the First Amendment has never been absolute, particularly with regard to
private, commercial relationships.422 For instance, the privacy torts of public
disclosure of private facts, invasion of privacy, and defamation do not run
afoul of the First Amendment.423 Similarly, as Neil Richards explains, data
privacy laws are constitutional because they pose no “menace [to] a free
press,”424 which is accorded higher levels of protection than private speech.
Thus, we have perfectly constitutional laws that aim to keep private our
health records and financial information. Frank Pasquale adds that search
results are “a matter of algorithmic data processing, not personal (or even
corporate) expression,” and thus entitled to even less constitutional
protection.425 Any right to be forgotten in the United States will not be a carte
blanche right to shape one’s internet profile in false or misleading ways, and
certainly not to limit or erase reporting by journalists, but it will require
balancing the public’s interest in information with an individual’s right to
privacy.
Criminal records are a prime example of why the right to be forgotten is
so important to marginalized communities. In America, one-third of the
population has a criminal record due to aggressive mass criminalization
policies that particularly impact people of color. 426 These records generate
419. 11 U.S.C. § 525 (2018). These protections, however, do not apply to private employers’
hiring decisions. See Shepard, supra note 87, at 1751.
420. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(2).
421. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, The Right To Be Forgotten, 64 STAN. L REV. ONLINE 88, 88
(2012), https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/privacy-paradox-the-right-to-be-forgotten/
[https://perma.cc/R88S-PH57] (describing the right to be forgotten “as the biggest threat to free
speech on the Internet in the coming decade”).
422. Lavi, supra note 397, at 2645–46. Lavi proposes guidelines for implementing a right to
be forgotten in the United States. Id. at 2649–73.
423. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 10, at 407–08 (discussing the tort for public disclosure
of public facts).
424. Neil M. Richards, Why Data Privacy Law Is (Mostly) Constitutional, 56 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1501, 1516 (2015).
425. Frank Pasquale, Reforming the Law of Reputation, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 515, 530 (2015).
426. Jeffrey Selbin, Justin McCrary & Joshua Epstein, Unmarked? Criminal Record
Clearing and Employment Outcomes, 108 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 3–4 (2018).
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collateral consequences that limit people’s access to employment, education,
and housing, as well as impact parental rights and freedom of movement—
of all which undermine any vision of economic justice.427 Accordingly, all
states have passed expungement laws, which allow people to apply to have
certain criminal records either deleted from official public databases or
marked as “expunged.”428 These laws are designed to provide people with a
“clean slate,” so that they can obtain jobs, housing, and other life necessities
“which in turn will reduce social and economic hardship for individuals,
families, and society.”429
Expungement laws, however, are undermined by data mining, particularly
the buying and selling of personal data for background check purposes. Once
a data broker collects a criminal record from a public database, that data lives
on in cyberspace.430 People must play a frustrating game of whack-a-mole,
constantly trying to clean up stale data where it emerges. Yet, it can be
impossible to know where expunged data is being reported, and even armed
with that knowledge, the FCRA process to correct such information in
consumer reports is cumbersome and difficult.431 Moreover, data brokers
often evade FCRA’s reach.432 Thus, a right to be forgotten that allows people
to demand digital expungements—or that limits release of criminal nonconviction records in the first instance433—could enhance our existing
expungement laws and expand access to life necessities and economic
security for millions of Americans.
Notably, the GDPR treats criminal records as a specially protected class
of data, providing that “[p]rocessing of personal data relating to criminal
convictions and offences” can happen only under governmental control or
laws that ensure safeguards for the rights and freedoms of data subjects. 434 In
427. See Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass
Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1790 (2012); Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of
Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457, 489–94
(2010).
428. Selbin et al., supra note 426, at 20–22. Expungement laws generally cover arrests that
did not result in conviction and misdemeanors.
429. Id. at 6.
430. Eldar Haber, Digital Expungement, 77 MD. L. REV. 337, 338 (2018) (“The fact that the
internet is capable of remembering everything makes expungement statutes ineffective in the
digital era.”).
431. Id. at 355 (describing shortcomings with FCRA remedies).
432. Id.
433. See id. at 381–83 (advocating for ex ante steps such as keeping non-conviction criminal
history records private); Selbin et al., supra note 426, at 53 (advocating for automatic record
clearing for not guilty verdicts and dismissals of charges).
434. GDPR, supra note 1, at art. 10.
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the EU, it is not necessary to talk about digital criminal records expungement
because criminal records and defendants’ identities are kept under wraps by
courts in the first instance.435 Convictions for minor offenses and arrests that
do not lead to convictions are never entered into the official record. 436 Private
databases of criminal records are illegal. 437 Obviously, expungement laws in
the United States are not as broad, as we have a historical commitment to
open criminal records.438 Despite this norm, every state has enacted laws to
limit the long-term impact of certain criminal records and to give people a
fresh start.439 Thus, a right to be forgotten could help state expungement laws
achieve their goals. More broadly, the right to be forgotten could ensure that
the social sorting driven by digital profiling does not become a permanent
barrier to economic advancement and that data errors and omissions do not
become fixed in time to the detriment of individuals.
D. Public Participation
The GDPR requires public input in certain data privacy programs, and
similar public participation opportunities should be adopted and expanded in
American privacy laws. The GDPR’s public participation requirements
attach to Data Protection Impact Assessments (DPIAs), which are reports that
data controllers must prepare when they process personal data. 440 DPIAs are
required whenever automated processing, particularly using new
technologies, “is likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of
natural persons.”441 High risk situations include profiling that has significant
effects, processing of sensitive categories of personal data (including criminal
convictions), and large-scale monitoring of public areas. 442 A DPIA must
contain a description of the intended processing and its purposes, the
necessity and proportionality of the processing, the risks to the rights and
freedoms of data subjects, and steps and safeguards the controller is taking to
435. Haber, supra note 430, at 376.
436. See James B. Jacobs & Elena Larrauri, Are Criminal Convictions a Public Matter? The
USA and Spain, 14 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 3, 13 (2012). Employers cannot access records, but
they can ask a job applicant for a copy of the official record. See id. at 6.
437. See id. at 12.
438. Haber, supra note 430, at 376–79.
439. Jonathan Rosenfeld, Expungement Laws Across the United States (Criminal Record
Removal),
ROSENFELD
INJ.
LAW.
LLC
(Feb.
4,
2019),
https://www.rosenfeldinjurylawyers.com/news/expungement-laws/
[https://perma.cc/YR27CMRH].
440. GDPR, supra note 1, at art. 35.
441. Id.
442. Id.
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protect personal data.443 Significantly for purposes of this discussion, data
subjects also have a role in the DPIA process: “Where appropriate, the
controller shall seek the views of data subjects or their representatives on the
intended processing . . . .”444 The A29WP provides that controllers can obtain
public views through a variety of means; 445 one consultant suggests “focus
groups, user groups, public meetings, consumer panels, town hall
meetings, individual interviews, paired interviews, and surveys.”446 The
A29WP adds that an entity whose final processing decision differs from the
views of data subjects should document its reasoning.447
In the United States, debates around comprehensive privacy legislation
and proposed federal bills have not contemplated public participation. By
contrast, public participation is a long-standing norm in a wide range of other
United States laws,448 most prominently in environmental regulation, land
use, and government programs impacting low income communities. 449
Depending on the statutory regime at issue, participation mechanisms can
range from the right to speak at a hearing or submit written comments to more
deliberative and collaborative settings, such as small group meetings,
information sessions, advisory councils, and consensus-based negotiations. 450
443. Id.
444. Id.
445. A29WP, supra note 336, at 8.
446. DPIA Under GDPR–Consult Your Data Subjects, CAPGEMINI (Apr. 23, 2018),
https://www.capgemini.com/2018/04/dpia-under-gdpr-consult-your-data-subjects/
[https://perma.cc/TJ7D-RGTD].
447. A29WP, supra note 336, at 15.
448. Nancy Roberts, Public Deliberation in an Age of Direct Citizen Participation, 34 AM.
REV. PUB. ADMIN. 315, 330 (2004) (explaining that public participation is found in areas “such
as education, policing, health and social services, justice and environmental systems, and
economic and community development”).
449. See, e.g., Anne E. Simon, Valuing Public Participation, 25 ECOLOGY L. Q. 757 (1999)
(environmental); Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A Collaborative
Model for Fostering Equality, Community Involvement and Adaptive Planning in Land Use
Decisions, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 36–40 (2005) (land use); Audrey McFarlane, When Inclusion
Leads to Exclusion: The Uncharted Terrain of Community Participation in Economic
Development, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 861 (2001) (land use); Jaime Alison Lee, Rights at Risk in
Privatized Public Housing, 50 TULSA L. REV. 759, 782–84 (2015) (public housing); Tomiko
Brown-Nagin, The Civil Rights Canon: Above and Below, 123 YALE L.J. 2698, 2730–34 (2014)
(describing the Equal Opportunity Act of 1964 and its mandate for “maximum feasible
participation” in community action agencies); Tara J, Melish, Maximum Feasible Participation
of the Poor: New Governance, New Accountability, and a 21st Century War on the Sources of
Poverty, 13 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1 (2010) (same); Wendy A. Bach, Mobilization and
Poverty Law: Searching for Participatory Democracy Amongst the Ashes of the War on Poverty,
20 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 96 (2012) (same).
450. See Thomas C. Beierle & Jerry Cayford, Environmental Decision Making: What Does
Public Participation Add?, 28 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 6 (2003); Archon Fung, Putting the Public
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Multiple theories of democracy support public participation in
policymaking. To begin with, decision-making is arguably improved when it
includes the perspectives of people most impacted, who can provide needed
information and novel problem-solving ideas. 451 In technical and scientific
realms, public participation can infuse a values-oriented perspective into
decision-making that might otherwise be overshadowed by technocratic
approaches.452 Public participation is also touted as a way to build legitimacy
in regulatory regimes because people gain trust from processes they
understand and shape.453 A separate strand of participatory democracy theory
focuses on benefits to impacted communities as they gain political and social
skills though participation in civic life, along with enhanced dignity and selfrespect.454 At bottom, public participation is “anchored by the democratic
values of political equality and popular sovereignty which are thrust upon the
republican form of government.”455
Privacy shares similarities with both the environmental and anti-poverty
realms. As with the environment, data privacy involves tensions between
corporate objectives and the public interest, with oversight by government
actors who are subject to regulatory capture. Like natural resources, privacy
is an integral resource for human flourishing—but once stripped, it is
difficult, if not impossible, to regain.456 Moreover, the looming dangers of
climate change and surveillance capitalism are similarly profound. As with
social welfare programs, marginalized communities are uniquely and
Back into Governance: The Challenges of Citizen Participation and Its Future, 75 PUB. ADMIN.
REV. 513, 517 (2015) (discussing emerging forms, such as multisectoral problem solving and
individualized engagement models of participation); Roberts, supra note 448, at 331–32
(discussing various mechanisms of citizen participation).
451. See Judith E. Innes & David E. Booher, Reframing Public Participation: Strategies for
the 21st Century, 5 PLAN. THEORY & PRAC. 419, 428–29 (2004); Roberts, supra note 448, at 324.
452. Beierle & Cayford, supra note 450, at 14.
453. See Roberts, supra note 448, at 323.
454. See Angela M. Gius, Dignifying Participation, 42 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 45,
61–62 (2018); McFarlane, supra note 449, at 911; Roberts, supra note 448, at 323.
455. RAJENDRA RAMLOGAN, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: TOWARDS A JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION 165 (2011); see also Barbara Bezdek, Citizen Engagement in the Shrinking City:
Toward Development Justice in an Era of Growing Inequality, 33 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 3, 9
(2013); Fung, supra note 450, at 515 (discussing the democratic governance justification for
public participation).
456. A. Michael Froomkin, Regulating Mass Surveillance as Privacy Pollution: Learning
from Environmental Impact Statements, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1713, 1715 (2015) (“Much like
global warming, drift-net data collection and collation creates widespread harms substantially
caused by actions not visible to most of those affected.”). Froomkin advocates for privacy impact
notices, similar to Environmental Impact Assessments, for proposed public or private mass
surveillance programs.

434

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

harmfully impacted. Yet with regard to data privacy, public involvement is
not formally part of existing or proposed regulatory schemes. This may be in
part due to public ignorance over the scope and scale of how technology
breaches privacy. One international privacy advocacy group reports
[m]ost consumers still think about online privacy as being primarily
concerned with the data they share, and not the data that is observed
from their behaviour, inferred or predicted. It is our experience that
the general understanding of how profiling works and the kinds of
information it can reveal is exceptionally low.457

When privacy scandals have come to light, the public has participated
primarily through cycles of media-generated outrage, litigation over data
security breaches, and particularly for low-income communities, through
small-scale public protests. These are not formalized mechanisms for ex ante
involvement, but rather, post hoc responses to moments of crisis—which
could possibly be avoided through participatory mechanisms in data privacy
regimes.
The GDPR’s public participation requirement is a modest one, and its
“when appropriate” caveat is undefined. Nevertheless, it opens the door to
thinking about how more expansive public participation norms might work
to enhance American data privacy. To begin with, perspectives of multiple
stakeholders should be involved in legislative hearings on data privacy, as
well as behind-the-door meetings and negotiations. To date, most testimony,
and presumably most lobbying efforts, have been provided by industry
representatives, with a small sampling of consumer-oriented, non-profit
groups involved. Elected representatives should invite—and consumer, civil
rights, and human rights groups should demand—a variety of perspectives in
the lawmaking process.
Shaping the laws is a start, but public participation should also be
incorporated into ongoing data privacy and data security regimes. As
agencies craft regulations, the public comment process should actively seek
input from a range of stakeholders, rather than passively waiting for
comments to be filed. The California Consumer Privacy Act specifically
calls upon the California Attorney General to solicit broad public
participation to adopt regulations to “further the purposes of this title,” as
well as to see if any substantive exceptions and modifications are needed
457. Data Is Power: Profiling and Automated Decision-Making in GDPR, PRIVACY INT’L 12
(2017),
https://privacyinternational.org/sites/default/files/2018-04/Data%20Is%20PowerProfiling%20and%20Automated%20Decision-Making%20in%20GDPR.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9JKV-SDJC].
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to accommodate changing technologies and other laws.458 This approach
should be adopted nationwide. It calls for government outreach, rather than
passive receipt of public comment, which is the bare minimum required for
regulatory rulemaking in the United States.
Laws and regulations are a start for public participation, but not the end. 459
At a minimum, similar to the GDPR, the United States should require entities
that process personal data—both private and governmental—to draft and
publish impact assessments that reflect input from a variety of
stakeholders.460 Impact assessments are a regular feature of environmental
law, which requires government agencies to prepare a detailed assessment of
the impact of proposed projects, including an analysis of whether certain
groups will face disproportionate negative consequences. 461 Privacy impact
assessments are required by the E-Government Act of 2002 for federal
agencies when implementing technology that collects information from the
public.462 However, they do not require public participation in the drafting or
post-publication process, and perhaps in part for that reason, the impact of
these impact statements has been limited.463
In addition, the FTC and other government agencies at the federal and state
levels overseeing privacy law implementation should conduct regular
458. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.185 (West 2020).
459. For a thorough listing and description of multiple participatory mechanisms, see
INVOLVE, PEOPLE & PARTICIPATION: HOW TO PUT CITIZENS AT THE HEART OF DECISIONMAKING 56–105 (2005), http://www.sharedpractice.org.uk/Downloads/involve_publication.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5RGU-NM5G].
460. On how impact assessments can improve algorithmic decision-making, see Andrew
Selbst, Madeleine Clare Elish & Mark Latonero, Accountable Algorithmic Futures, DATA &
SOC’Y POINTS (Apr. 19, 2019), https://points.datasociety.net/building-empirical-research-intothe-future-of-algorithmic-accountability-act-d230183bb826
[https://perma.cc/DXJ8-TTUB];
Selbst, supra note 115, at 169–82.
461. Sonia K. Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 66 UCLA
L. REV. 54, 113 (2018).
462. E-Government Act of 2002 § 208, 44 U.S.C. § 3602 (2018); see also Dep’t of Homeland
Sec.,
E-Government
Act
of
2002,
JUST.
INFO.
SHARING,
https://it.ojp.gov/PrivacyLiberty/authorities/statutes/1287 [https://perma.cc/8WQC-ZEWE]. The
PIA is an “analysis of how information is handled by federal agencies,” and it must contain a
description of the information collected and its purpose, the agency’s intended use, whether and
with whom the information will be shared, how the information is secured, and whether the
privacy policy is in a machine-readable format. OMB Guidance for Implementing the Privacy
Provisions of the E-Government Act of 2002, OFF. MGMT. & BUDGET (Sept. 26, 2003),
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/omb/memoranda/m03-22.html
[https://perma.cc/A2LH-V3UN].
463. Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, PIA Requirements and Privacy
Decision-Making in U.S. Government Agencies, in PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT 225, 233
(David Wright & Paul De Hert eds., 2012).
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surveys and/or focus groups to seek public input on the impacts of data
privacy and to identify trends and concerns. Prior public surveys have
revealed that low-income people have greater concerns about their data
privacy and feel less secure in their ability to manage their data. 464 In addition,
privacy enforcement agencies should hold regular public hearings on
emerging data privacy issues and include a range of stakeholders. Notably,
past hearings at the FTC have generated informative descriptions of data
processing activity along with sound (but unadopted) recommendations. 465
Government agencies should create inclusive consumer and employee
advisory councils empowered to gather and share information about data
privacy practices and impacts. Data privacy agencies should also engage in
public education efforts to inform people about the uses and abuses of their
data and their data privacy rights and enforcement options.
Technology can be harnessed for both information gathering and
educational purposes. The goal should be to engage in an ongoing dialogue
with the public to ensure that the promise of big data is fulfilled, while
limiting its more harmful impacts. Through dialogue, society may identify
certain digital technologies and data practices that should be constrained or
eliminated outright. For instance, some privacy experts have advocated to
ban facial recognition technology466 and targeted advertising,467 and sustained
debate from multiple stakeholders might further shape substantive
interventions into technological applications that advance economic
justice.468
464. See supra notes 17–21 and accompanying text.
465. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY (May 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/databrokers-call-transparency-accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/S2LB-U6AC].
466. See, e.g., Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Facial Recognition is the Perfect Tool for
Oppression, MEDIUM (Aug. 2, 2018), https://medium.com/s/story/facial-recognition-is-theperfect-tool-for-oppression-bc2a08f0fe66 [https://perma.cc/PFK2-JCBQ]; Max Read, Why We
Should Ban Facial Recognition Technology, N.Y. MAG. (Jan. 30, 2020),
https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/01/why-we-should-ban-facial-recognitiontechnology.html [https://perma.cc/9UGX-WCAA].
467. See, e.g., David Dayen, Ban Targeted Advertising, NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 10, 2018),
https://newrepublic.com/article/147887/ban-targeted-advertising-facebook-google
[https://perma.cc/CQ87-DH8E]; Gilad Edelman, Why Don’t We Just Ban Targeted Advertising,
WIRED (Mar. 22, 2020), https://www.wired.com/story/why-dont-we-just-ban-targetedadvertising/ [https://perma.cc/HJ24-LJHD].
468. There are numerous laws applicable to specific settings, situations, and relationships that
could further enhance data privacy and improve economic justice; some of these exist already in
certain state and local jurisdictions. Some examples include limitations on the use of tenant
screening reports and tenant blacklisting practices; enhanced controls over the data broker
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To be sure, there are many barriers to effective public participation that
must be addressed to ensure that participation is meaningful, rather than mere
window dressing. In the 1960s, Sherry Arnstein developed an influential
“ladder of citizen participation,”469 describing eight levels of participation
“with each rung corresponding to the extent of citizen’s power in determining
the end product.”470 At the bottom levels are non-participatory mechanisms
in which officials talk at participants.471 The ladder then progresses to token
levels of participation, such as consultation; here, citizens may be heard, but
they lack the power to shape outcomes. 472 At the top three rungs of the ladder,
citizens gain power “with increasing degrees of decision making clout.” 473 At
the very top, there is citizen control, where “have-not citizens” hold a
majority of the decision-making seats or even full managerial control. 474
Consistent with the ladder analogy, empirical studies have shown that the
public has the greatest impact when processes are collaborative and
deliberative, as opposed to one-way communications, such as testifying at a
public hearing or submitting a written comment. 475
Another barrier to effective public participation can be the expertise
needed to master complex scientific and technological issues; 476 this has been
a long-standing issue with regard to public participation in environmental
law. Data privacy involves complex systems such as machine learning and
algorithmic operations. Nevertheless, laypeople are certainly able to
understand how they are being impacted by technology on a daily basis, and
with some education around digital literacy, can appreciate the unseen hand
of technological impacts. It is important to recognize the expertise held by
the public; the key is providing a forum for technical expertise and lived

industry; limitations on the online payday and installment loan industries; algorithmic
accountability statutes for automated decision-making by government agencies; expanded
consumer protections against coerced debt (debt accrued by abusers in the name of their victims
of intimate partner violence); and limitations on employee and student monitoring and
surveillance.
469. Sherry R. Arnstein, A Ladder of Citizen Participation, 35 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 216
(1969).
470. Id. at 217. From the bottom to the top, the rungs are manipulation, therapy, informing,
consultation, placation, partnership, delegated power, and citizen control. Id.
471. Id.
472. Id.
473. Id.
474. Id.
475. See Beierle & Cayford, supra note 450, at 16; Bezdek, supra note 455, at 33–36, 50–
51; Innes & Booher, supra note 451, at 422.
476. Roberts, supra note 448, at 325–26, 339.
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expertise to be synthesized.477 Moreover, data scientists are making strides in
translating machine learning concepts for non-experts.
Skeptics of public participation also point to the additional costs and time
incurred when additional processes are layered onto already complex
decision-making schemes.478 Supporters counter that long-term costs are
saved by improved outcomes. Moreover, participation has benefits beyond
outcomes, as people gain skills and knowledge through the process of
participation. As people understand the value of their personal data and that
of their networks, the value of their participation will be heightened. And, as
people feel more secure about their data, they may be more likely to be
involved in civic engagement in other areas. In an era of increasing social
alienation due to technology, it is possible that public participation in
securing data privacy may bring people together.
Finally, in any public participation processes, it is essential to understand
the pitfalls that are magnified for low-income people, whose
“perspectives . . . may be disregarded due to factors such as race, culture,
income, and language; a lack of traditional markers of expertise such as
educational or professional credentials; and a lack of other resources that
provide influence and bargaining advantages.”479 There are risks that
superficial participation can generate distrust, while diverting resources from
other social justice reform efforts, and even make it hard to contest outcomes
that “carry the presumption of community endorsement.” 480 Having a voice
is meaningless without real power.481 Moreover, “a cosmetic process
invariably favors those already in power.”482 Accordingly, public
participation must be sensitive to multi-cultural values 483 and look to best
practices to ensure that it does not further marginalize low-income and
minority communities. In the realm of the environment, the environmental
justice movement to combat environmental racism has led to multiple,
477. Gius, supra note 454, at 60–61.
478. See Roberts, supra note 448, at 324, 339.
479. Jaime Alison Lee, “Can You Hear Me Now?”: Making Participatory Governance Work
for the Poor, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 405, 414 (2013); see also Gius, supra note 454 at 83–84;
Svitlana Kravchenko, The Myth of Public Participation in a World of Poverty, 23 TUL. ENVTL.
L.J. 33, 45 (2009); McFarlane, supra note 449, at 914–15; Roberts, supra note 448, at 326, 337–
38 (discussing the dilemma of excluded or oppressed groups).
480. Douglas NeJaime, When New Governance Fails, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 323, 348 (2009).
481. Jaime Alison Lee, Poverty, Dignity, and Public Housing, 47 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
97, 135 (2015).
482. Lee, supra note 479, at 414.
483. See generally John C. Duncan, Multicultural Participation in the Public Hearing
Process: Some Theoretical, Pragmatic, and Analeptical Considerations, 24 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
169 (1999).
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concrete participatory best practices to include and empower marginalized
populations. These experiences demonstrate that meaningful participation by
marginalized groups requires a commitment of resources and affirmative
outreach. People’s lives are being shaped by digital profiling and surveillance
systems, and in a democracy, they should have a say in how these systems
operate.
E. Implementation and Enforcement
The GDPR involves multiple stakeholders in implementation, as part of
its “data protection by design” approach, which aims to integrate data
protection into processing technology, from the design stage and beyond. 484
The GDPR considers privacy as a human right, thereby granting individuals
certain (non-absolute) rights, such as the right to explanation and the right to
be forgotten, as discussed previously in this Article. 485 Individuals can
demand their rights directly from controllers, and in cases of noncompliance,
they can file a complaint with their country’s Data Protection Authority
(DPA) or go to court and seek compensation.486 Individuals do not shoulder
the bulk of privacy enforcement. Rather, the GDPR includes a range of actors
to foster compliance. It is a “collaborative governance” regime, which
harnesses individual, business, and governmental oversight.487 Thus, third
parties, such as interest groups and digital rights foundations, can litigate on
individuals’ behalf,488 and in certain countries, bring cases as representatives
of the public interest.489
For their part, data controllers must abide by a variety of proactive
accountability mechanisms. The GDPR recognizes “that a regulator cannot
do everything by top-down control, but that controllers must themselves be
involved in the design of less privacy-invasive systems.” 490 Among their
obligations, controllers need to adopt and implement data protection

484. GDPR, supra note 1, at art. 25.
485. See supra notes 307–319 and accompanying text.
486. GDPR supra note 1, at arts. 77 (right to lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority),
78 (right to an effective judicial remedy against a supervisory authority), 79 (right to an effective
judicial remedy against a controller or processor), 82 (right to compensation and liability).
487. See generally Margot Kaminski, Binary Governance; Lessons from the GDPR’s
Approach to Algorithmic Accountability, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1529 (2019).
488. GDPR, supra note 1, at art. 80(1).
489. Id. at art. 80(2).
490. Edwards & Veale, supra note 331, at 50.

440

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

policies491 and security measures and appoint an independent Data Protection
Officer to oversee compliance.492 They must communicate in a timely,
concise and intelligible way with data subjects about the processing of their
personal data.493 They must report data breaches to their country’s Data
Protection Authority, as well as to impacted individuals. 494 They are
responsible for GDPR violations committed by their processors, such as data
centers and cloud providers.495 They must draft and carry out DPIAs when
their processing of personal data is likely to result in high risk to individual
interests, and also consult with their country’s DPA when those situations
arise.496 The GDPR provides that controllers can demonstrate their
compliance through voluntary certification programs; EU member states are
expected to issue compliance standards. 497
Government also has a key role through each member state’s DPA. 498 The
DPAs have “investigatory,” “advisory,” and “corrective” powers. 499 They are
charged with gathering information, conducting regular audits, advising
companies about compliance mechanisms; and creating codes of conduct and
approving certification methods.500 In terms of enforcement, DPAs can
investigate individual complaints, halt unlawful processing, and bring legal
proceedings against controllers and processors. 501 Moreover, the GDPR
contains bite behind its bark—DPAs can impose maximum fines of up to
twenty million euros or four percent of global annual turnover for the most

491. GDPR, supra note 1, at arts. 24 (responsibility of the controller), 25 (data protection by
design and default), 32 (security of processing).
492. Id. at arts. 37 (designation of the data protection officer), 38 (position of the data
protection officer), 39 (tasks of the data protection officer).
493. Id. at art. 12(1).
494. Id. at arts. 33 (notification of a personal data breach to the supervisory authority), 34
(communication of a personal data breach to the data subject).
495. Id. at art. 24 (responsibility of the controller); see also id. at art. 4 (defining processor
as “a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which processes personal
data on behalf of the controller”).
496. Id. at arts. 35 (data protection impact assessment), 36 (prior consultation).
497. Id. at arts. 42 (certification), 51 (supervisory authority).
498. Id. at art. 51 (supervisory authority). These are called supervisory authorities in the text
of the GDPR but are commonly referred to as Data Protection Authorities. See Chris Jay
Hoofnagle et al., The European Union General Data Protection Regulation: What It Is and What
It Means, 28 INFO. & COMM. TECH. L. REV. 65, 74 (2018).
499. Hoofnagle et al., supra note 498, at 95.
500. GDPR, supra note 1, at arts. 57 (tasks), 58 (powers).
501. A full list of tasks and powers of supervisory authorities is in Hoofnagle et al., supra
note 498.
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severe transgressions.502 Proportional penalties “ensure[ ] that even the titans
of industry will not be immune from enforcement.”503
Taken together, this bundle of obligations provides “systematic
accountability”504 that relieves individuals of shouldering the burden of
enforcement. The GDPR framework is thus similar to the concept of
technological due process, which scholars, including Danielle Citron, 505 Kate
Crawford and Jason Schultz,506 and Frank Pasquale,507 have proposed to
encapsulate U.S. constitutional due process values of transparency, accuracy,
accountability, public participation, and fairness within privacy law.508 These
scholars have taken due process norms developed to constrain government
decision-making in an analog world and adapted them to both public and
private conduct in the digital world.509 They call for enhancing individual
rights by requiring that people obtain meaningful notice and explanations
about automated processing.510 They advocate for improved hearing
processes, along with better training for hearing officers about technology. 511
Further, these scholars advocate for extensive government oversight of
algorithmic decision-making via regular audits of algorithms for biases,
inaccuracies, and other unfair methodologies, ideally through partnerships
with neutral, expert third parties.512
Importantly, these scholars extend due process beyond the governmental
context, where it exists as a matter of United States constitutional law, and
into the private realm, which is particularly appropriate given how
intertwined governmental and private data collection and processes operate
and the extensive powers private tech companies currently wield over
citizens.513 These ideas have been influential. New York City passed a bill to
502. GDPR, supra note 1, at art. 83.
503. Casey et al., supra note 320, at 167.
504. Margot E. Kaminski & Gianclaudio Malgieri, Algorithmic Impact Assessments Under
the GDPR: Producing Multi-Layered Explanations 3 (Univ. of Colo. Law Sch., Research Paper
No. 19-28, 2019), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3456224
[https://perma.cc/6KFW-7XJ4].
505. Citron, supra note 127.
506. Crawford & Schultz, supra note 234, at 121–22.
507. PASQUALE, supra note 279; Citron & Pasquale supra note 147.
508. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 147, at 20; Crawford & Schultz, supra note 234, at 127.
509. See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 147; Crawford & Schultz, supra note 234.
510. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 147, at 27; Crawford & Schultz, supra note 234, at 122–
23.
511. Citron, supra note 127, at 1305–08; Crawford & Schultz, supra note 234, at 125–26.
512. Citron, supra note 127, at 1310–11; Citron & Pasquale, supra note 147, at 20–21, 25,
26, 28; Crawford & Schultz, supra note 234, at 125–26.
513. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 147, at 20–26; Crawford & Schultz, supra note 234, at
125–27.
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improve algorithmic accountability within city agencies; 514 several states
have considered similar bills;515 and a bill has been proposed in Congress to
improve accountability through impact assessments and audits. 516 The idea of
algorithmic accountability is to ensure that government agencies and
businesses self-assess their automated decision systems and obtain external,
expert review of their algorithms, while providing individuals with
meaningful due process rights to challenge unfair, biased, or otherwise
harmful systems. Using GDPR-style enforcement mechanisms—systemic,
collaborative, and diffuse—to develop digital due process in the United
States is essential to protecting the rights of all Americans, and particularly
marginalized groups, who have less voice within the political process and less
access to legal resources to enforce their rights.
V.

WHAT ABOUT THE CALIFORNIA CONSUMER PRIVACY ACT?

The California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) went into effect on January
1, 2019, and it is currently the most robust consumer privacy law in the
United States.517 Along with the GDPR, it is providing impetus for a federal
law,518 and its implementation is being closely watched. The CCPA creates
three core rights for consumers: (1) to know what personal information
companies collect and share about them; (2) to have personal information
deleted upon request; and (3) to opt-out of the sale of personal information. 519
In addition, as with the GDPR, consumers are protected against

514. New York City passed a bill to study how city agencies use algorithms; the effort has
had mixed results. See AI NOW INST., CONFRONTING BLACK BOXES 11–16 (Rashida Richardson,
ed.) (2019), https://ainowinstitute.org/ads-shadowreport-2019.html [https://perma.cc/3U3LWQAJ]; Colin Lechter, New York City’s Algorithm Task Force Is Fracturing, VERGE (Apr. 15,
2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/4/15/18309437/new-york-city-accountability-task-forcelaw-algorithm-transparency-automation [https://perma.cc/AK68-T5JW].
515. See Sigal Samuel, 10 Things We Should All Demand from Big Tech Right Now, VOX
(May 29, 2019), https://www.vox.com/the-highlight/2019/5/22/18273284/ai-algorithmic-bill-ofrights-accountability-transparency-consent-bias [https://perma.cc/A4BL-MTFV] (discussing
efforts in Washington and Oregon).
516. Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2019, H.R. 2231, 116th Cong. (2019); Algorithmic
Accountability Act of 2019, S. 1108, 116th Cong. (2019).
517. Chander et al., supra note 27, at 1, 3.
518. Id. at 25.
519. To facilitate opt-out requests, businesses must provide a “Do Not Sell My Info” link on
their website or mobile app. Consumers can opt out of sales to third parties but not out of
collection in the first instance (such as by Facebook and Google as a condition of using the
service). CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100(a), 1798.110(a), 1798.115(a) (West 2020); Chander et al.,
supra note 27, at 22.
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discrimination for exercising their statutory rights. Importantly, it scoops data
brokers into its coverage.520
While it enhances consumer control over personal data significantly for
California residents, it is narrower than the GDPR, and thus provides less
promise for advancing economic justice. Although it contains a broad
definition of personal data,521 the CCPA only applies to certain businesses 522
and does not apply to non-profits or government agencies. 523 Given the
regular interaction between poor people and the state, along with the increase
in automated decision-making by government agencies, this omission is
significant. Moreover, the CCPA does not provide a right of explanation or a
right not to be subject to solely automated processing, which create
opportunities to identify and constrain digital discrimination and exploitation
while heightening algorithmic accuracy. 524 The CCPA does contain a right to
deletion,525 similar to the right to be forgotten, although businesses under the
CCPA have broader exceptions from compliance and fewer obligations to
constrain downstream users. 526 In terms of enforcement, individuals can only
bring private rights of action under the CCPA for data breaches, leaving
enforcement of the other data privacy provisions to the Attorney General. 527
The CCPA contains a more concrete commitment to public participation than
does the GDPR, requiring the Attorney General to solicit public opinion in
crafting regulations,528 but it does not appear to require ongoing public
participation in monitoring implementation as does the GDPR. The primary
difference between the GDPR and the CCPA is that the former permits data
processing only where expressly allowed, while the latter permits it freely
unless expressly forbidden.529 Thus, to the degree the CCPA is serving as a
model for Congress and other states, those jurisdictions would be well served
520. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.120 (West 2020); Chander et al., supra note 27, at 14.
521. It includes information linked at the household or device level, which is broader than
the GDPR. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(o)(1) (West 2020).
522. The CCPA applies to businesses with gross annual revenues higher than twenty-five
million dollars; or more than fifty percent annual revenues from selling consumer personal
information; or engaged in purchase or sell of personal information of at least fifty thousand
consumers. Id. § 1798.140(c).
523. See id. Employees will gain full coverage effective January 1, 2021. Id. § 1798.145.
524. See Chander et al., supra note 27, at 20.
525. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.105 (West 2020).
526. Chander et al., supra note 27, at 17–18.
527. Id. at 21.
528. The Attorney General’s Office held seven public forums across the state, and it received
and considered more than 300 written comments. OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., CALIFORNIA
CONSUMER
PRIVACY
ACT
(CCPA)
FACT
SHEET
3,
https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/attachments/press_releases/CCPA%20Fact%20Sheet%20%2800
000002%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/7BPG-ATUH].
529. Chander et al., supra note 27, at 19.
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to also consider those GDPR-style provisions that could particularly assist
their low-income residents.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Low-income people in the United States face more serious harms from
digital profiling than other Americans. Their digital profiles mark them as
poor and lessen their ability to rent a house, get a stable job, obtain a car loan,
enroll in college, afford health insurance, or receive adequate medical care.
Governments are adopting automated decision-making as a gatekeeper to
social services, but these algorithms often contain inaccurate interpretations
of law and/or rely on erroneous data, leaving qualified people without sorely
needed assistance. Surveillance tools, including facial recognition
technology, are more heavily concentrated in low-income and minority
communities, stripping people of dignity, ensnaring them in the criminal
justice and child welfare systems, and undermining their housing stability.
Currently, neither American privacy laws nor anti-discrimination statutes
have the teeth to disrupt these digitized patterns of targeting and exclusion
that keep people in poverty and destabilize communities. Society pays the
resulting financial and destabilizing costs of incarceration, underemployment, ill health, and family instability. Accordingly, as Congress
debates comprehensive privacy legislation, it is imperative that the needs and
interests of low-income and marginalized communities are part of the
discussion and considered in crafting solutions. The GDPR, which governs
data privacy in the European Union, provides a template to spur discussions
about linking data privacy to economic justice. In the EU, people are entitled
to explanations about automated decision-making and recourse to human
decision-makers. They have a right to a digital clean slate to open up future
economic opportunities. They have some say in the digital regimes that
govern them, and they have meaningful and systemic enforcement
mechanisms to secure all these rights. These GDPR provisions alone will not
eliminate oppression and injustice. However, they provide enhanced
transparency and accountability to people impacted by digital technologies,
which in turn, can be building blocks for social justice movements and
further, substantive reforms. The United States should adopt similar privacy
law provisions to advance civil rights and economic justice.

